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This paper presents a systematic exposition of the general structure of 
visual constancies and illusions, including the introduction of a number of 
conceptual distinctions, illustrated by many examples. The study of these 
phenomena involves the distal, the proximal, and the phenomenal domain. 
The relations of concordance and discordance between pairs of domains are 
defined, followed by the definitions of four visual modes (concordant, 
proximal, constancy, illusion) as particular constellations of concordance-
discordance relations between all three domains. Constancies and illusions 
are characterized by proximal-phenomenal discordance. Attributes of entities 
of visual domains are divided into the geometric (size, shape, location, 
orientation) and the photometric (reflectance, illumination) class. The 
phenomenal domain involves two types of attributes, one group distally and 
the other proximally focused. Research on both constancies and illusions can 
be described as involving the study of the effects of two independent variables 
on a dependent variable. The first independent variable (target variable) is a 
distal attribute, such as size, shape etc. In constancy studies, the second 
independent variable (confound variable), is a variable such as distance, 
orientation etc, that, together with the confound variable, affects the 
corresponding proximal variable (such as proximal size, shape etc). In 
illusion studies, confound variables do not affect the proximal variables, but 
do affect the corresponding phenomenal variables. The main part of the 
paper consists in the descriptions of studies of constancies and illusions of 
size, shape, location, orientation, and achromatic and chromatic color, all 
presented in a common format, which facilitates the comparison of their 
similarities and differences. The importance of presentation conditions (full-
cue versus reduced cue) and instruction type (distally versus proximally 
focused) is stressed. Finally, salient cases are pointed out in which relations 
between phenomenal variables tend to take a form qualitatively similar to the 
relation of the corresponding non-phenomenal variables. 
Key words: constancies, illusions, distal, proximal, extrinsic, 
intrinsic 
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Studies of constancies and illusions comprise a significant portion of 
traditional vision research. In this paper I provide a systematically organized 
presentation of main aspects of these phenomena. My aim is neither a 
historical overview, nor an exhaustive presentation of particular effects, nor 
the discussion of various theoretical approaches. Rather, the goal is to present 
the general structure of these perceptual phenomena. The commonality of 
aspects of various constancies and illusions has often been noted and 
discussed in the perception literature. The attempt in this paper is to present 
these issues in a general framework and thus to bring them into a sharper 
focus. The emphasis is on the systematic exposition of main concepts, their 
relations, and basic experimental results. In this way a number of similarities, 
differences, and other relations between various phenomena will be stressed, 
which are not often in the center of attention of researchers of particular 
phenomena, but may be helpful for the prospect of increased understanding of 
the general issues involved in studies of constancies and illusions. 
Part I introduces some basic conceptual architecture. Various visual 
domains and their entities, states, and attributes, as well as relations between 
them are defined. Part II describes the general framework within which the 
phenomena will be discussed. Part III contains the main presentation of 
constancies and illusions in the perception of size, shape, location, orientation, 
and achromatic and chromatic color. Part IV contains a summary and some 
closing comments. 
The handbook by Boff, Kaufman & Thomas (1986) contains articles with 
in-depth discussions of many topics dealt with in this paper. A book, devoted 
mainly to constancies, was edited by Epstein (1977), and book-length reviews 
of illusions are provided by Coren & Girgus (1978) and Robinson (1972). 
Earlier reviews of most relevant phenomena include Koffka (1935), 
Woodworth & Schlosberg (1954), Hochberg (1971a, b), and Rock (1975). 
 
 
 
PART I: BASIC CONCEPTS 
 
A. Visual domains 
 
Visual perception is the optically mediated cognition of the environment. 
Its study typically involves four aspects or domains. Two of these domains are 
external  and two are internal  with respect to the perceiver. The external 
domains are the distal domains, constituted by the outside world and its 
objects, and the proximal  domain, which is the optical projection of the 
external world on the retina. The internal domains are the organismic domain, 
which involves all visually relevant neural activities as well as the postures   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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and motions of the eyes and the head, and the phenomenal domain, which 
refers to the conscious visual awareness of the world. 
Each domain involves a temporal succession of states. A particular state 
of the distal domain is the visual scene, a state of the proximal domain is the 
retinal or proximal image, a state of the organismic domain is constituted by 
the neural and postural activity profiles, and a state of the phenomenal domain 
is the conscious percept. All these concepts are represented in Figure 1. 
 
 
EXTERNAL  INTERNAL 
Domain distal  proximal  organismic  phenomenal 
State scene  image  profile  percept 
 
Figure 1: Visual domains and states 
 
Each state of a domain is constituted by a number of particular entities. 
These entities are the various objects and processes that are characteristic for 
each domain. Properties of the entities will be referred to as the visual 
variables or attributes. There are two main classes of visual attributes, the 
geometric and the photometric class. Geometric and photometric attributes of 
entities in different domains, as well as their relations, will be discussed in the 
following sections. The analyses will mainly involve the relations between the 
distal, the proximal, and the phenomenal domain, with some considerations of 
postural aspects. The activities of the neural system are not in the focus of this 
paper. 
 
1. The distal domain 
 
Some basic aspects of distal geometric and photometric attributes will be 
considered in this section, and will be treated in more detail later on. The 
geometric attributes concern extension and position,  involving the spatial 
distribution of objects and the layout of the environment. The photometric 
attributes concern color and light, involving properties of illumination and 
surface reflection. Within both classes of attributes, two subclasses can be 
distinguished: those attributes that are intrinsic to the objects, and those that 
are  extrinsic. All these attributes are referred to as distal, in order to 
distinguish them from corresponding geometric and photometric proximal and Dejan Todorović   
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phenomenal attributes, which will be treated in the discussions of the 
corresponding domains. 
Geometric attributes. The simplest entities in 3-D space are material 
points, that is, objects of essentially negligible extension. The only geometric 
attribute of such objects is their location in 3-D space, defined with respect to 
some frame of reference. The reference frame may be associated with the 
perceiver, in which case location is perceiver-relative or egocentric, or it may 
be associated with some external object, in which case it is object-relative or 
exocentric. The location of a point can be decomposed in various ways into 
components. One way is the decomposition into three Cartesian co-ordinates. 
However, perceptually more relevant is the decomposition into the attributes 
of direction and distance with respect to the reference frame. 
For environmental objects of non-negligible extension, additional 
attributes can be considered. Such an attribute is orientation with respect to 
some frame of reference. Orientation is most directly associated with lines and 
planes, but it can also be attributed to 3-D objects for which a canonical axis 
or plane can be defined. Like location, orientation can be defined as egocentric 
or exocentric. Orientation can be further decomposed in different ways, one of 
which is the decomposition into tilt and  slant, a distinction that will be 
elaborated in later sections. I will use position as a superordinate term 
comprising both location and orientation. 
The attributes of position can be considered as extrinsic or accidental, 
because most objects can change their location and orientation but still remain 
essentially the same objects. Other attributes, especially of rigid objects, can 
be considered as more intrinsic or non-accidental. Such are the attributes of 
shape and size. I will use extension as a superordinate term for both shape and 
size. Since all discussed geometric attributes belong to the distal domain, they 
will be referred to as distal geometric attributes. Thus I will talk about distal 
size, distal shape, etc. The terms physical or objective are also often used with 
the same meaning. 
Photometric attributes. These attributes are exhibited by lights, and 
object surfaces. Light is constituted by electromagnetic waves whose wave-
length falls within the visible spectrum, that is, between about 400 and 700 
nanometers. Light is emitted by light sources and transmitted, absorbed, or 
reflected by object surfaces. Monochromatic  light sources emit light of a 
narrow band of wavelengths. However, most light sources are polychromatic, 
that is, they emit light of many or all wavelengths in the spectrum. The main 
photometric characteristics of a light source, is its spectral distribution, that is, 
the relative amount of light energy emitted at different wavelengths of the 
spectrum per unit time. 
The photometric characteristics of object  surfaces  are also defined by 
spectral distributions. However, they do not involve the amount of emitted   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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light but reflectance, that is, the percentage or fraction of reflected light at 
each wavelength. Most surfaces are polychromatic, that is, they reflect light of 
all wavelengths. Achromatic surfaces are non-selectively reflective, that is, 
they reflect approximately the same fraction of light at all wavelengths, in 
contrast to chromatic surfaces, which have different reflectances at different 
wavelengths, and thus are selectively reflective. 
The illumination of a surface is the amount of light falling upon it per 
unit time. The more light falls upon an object, the more will be reflected from 
it, but the fraction of reflected light remains constant, independently of the 
amount illumination. Thus reflectance is an intrinsic attribute of a surface (if 
we disregard cases like the skin of the chameleon or the possibility of 
repainting of a surface). In contrast, illumination is an extrinsic, accidental 
attribute of objects. I will use distal color as a superordinate term for spectral 
distributions of both chromatic and achromatic lights and surfaces. 
The main geometric and photometric attributes of objects, divided into 
intrinsic (extension, surface color) and extrinsic (position, illumination color), 
are presented in Figure 2. Constancies and illusions in the perception of these 
attributes are discussed in this paper. Note an asymmetry in this classification: 
objects have both size and shape, and both location and orientation, but they 
have either chromatic or achromatic reflectance and illumination. 
 
 
 
GEOMETRIC PHOTOMETRIC 
INTRINSIC 
extension 
(shape, size) 
surface color 
(chromatic, achromatic) 
EXTRINSIC 
position 
(location, orientation) 
illumination color 
(chromatic, achromatic) 
 
Figure 2: Attributes of distal objects 
 
The geometric attributes concern the distribution of macroscopic matter 
in space and are in principle independent from photometric attributes: they 
would exist even if all matter were completely transparent to light, and they 
continue to exist in total darkness. However, it is the photometric attributes of 
matter that make the external world cognizable by means of light-sensitive 
visual sense organs. 
Dynamics of attributes. Both geometric and photometric attributes of 
objects may change their values over time. The change of geometric attributes 
is  motion. Rigid objects can undergo two basic types of motions, both 
involving extrinsic attributes: translation, which changes their location, and Dejan Todorović   
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rotation, which changes their orientation. Non-rigid objects may also change 
their intrinsic geometrical attributes: dilatation/contraction changes size, 
whereas deformation changes shape. More radical changes may involve break-
up or conjoinment of objects. Dynamics of photometric attributes involves the 
temporal change of the extrinsic attribute of illumination and, in rare cases, the 
intrinsic attribute of reflectance.  
 
2. The proximal domain 
 
A visual scene becomes the distal stimulus when it is optically projected 
on the retina of an observer. The retinal image formed by the bundle of 
projected light rays constitutes the proximal stimulus. The entities and 
attributes of the projected image are studied within the proximal domain. 
The laws of projective optical geometry establish correspondences 
between distal objects and proximal objects. Furthermore, distal geometric and 
photometric attributes have counterpart proximal geometric and photometric 
attributes. Some basic aspects of these correspondences are depicted in Figure 
3. It involves a light source, whose rays illuminate a distal object. The rays 
reflected from the distal object project an image of it on the retina, which is 
depicted in cross-section as a semi-circle. This image is the corresponding 
proximal object. Examples of spectral distributions of illumination, 
reflectance, and luminance (the amount of reflected light arriving at the retina 
per unit time) are presented as graphs, with wavelength at the abscissa, and at 
the ordinate the relative amount of light (for illumination and luminance) or 
fraction of light (for reflectance). Properties of these spectral distributions will 
be dealt with in more detail in the section on chromatic color perception. 
A  distal  point has, as its proximal counterpart, the corresponding 
proximal point on the retina. The proximal point is the projection of the distal 
point on the retina. It is located at the intersection of the retina and the 
projection ray. The projection ray is an imaginary line directed from the distal 
point through the nodal point of the eye, which is an imaginary geometrical 
point. The actual physical process is more complicated, as it involves the 
divergence of reflected light rays from each object point, and their refraction 
and convergence by the cornea and the lens of the eye. However, the end 
result, that is, the location of the projected point on the retina, is well 
approximated with the nodal point construction. The imaging processes within 
the eye introduce some blur due to effects of spherical and chromatic 
aberration, which will not be considered here. 
 
   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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LIGHT
SOURCE
retina
DISTAL
OBJECT
PROXIMAL
OBJECT
illumination
reflectance
visual axis fovea
gaze
locus
nodal
point
luminance
Figure 3: Basic aspects of the projection of the scene onto the retina
 
An extended distal object has as its proximal counterpart the corresponding 
proximal object. It is constituted by the set of projected points of the distal 
object. The geometric and photometric attributes of distal objects correspond to 
geometric and photometric attributes of proximal objects. Distal location 
corresponds to proximal location, that is, the location of the projection of the 
distal point on the retina. Distal orientation corresponds to proximal orientation, 
that is, orientation of the projected object on the retina. Distal size corresponds 
to proximal size, which is the size of the proximal object, measured in angular 
terms. Distal shape corresponds to proximal shape, which is the shape of the 
projection of the distal object. Distal surface color corresponds to proximal 
color, which is the luminance. 
In the foregoing paragraphs the structure of the retinal image was described 
in its dependence on the distal domain. However, it also depends on the position 
of the eye with respect to the environment. For example, rotation of the eye 
changes the locations of proximal objects, tilting the head changes their 
orientations, whereas motion of the head and body through space changes their 
shapes and sizes. The position of the retina can be partly specified by an 
imaginary line through the fovea (the locus of best resolution on the retina) and 
the nodal point. This is the visual axis or the line of sight (or regard). It 
represents the gaze direction, and its intersection with the object is the point of 
fixation or gaze locus. These notions are indicated on Figure 3. 
 Dejan Todorović   
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3. The phenomenal domain 
 
Light emitted from light sources or reflected from distal objects eventually 
affects the retinal rods and cones, which transduce optical energy into neural 
excitation. Activation of retinal receptors initiates processes in the rest of the 
visual nervous system. As noted before, the neural foundations of visual 
perception are out of the scope of this paper. 
Some, as yet not fully specified aspect of neural activity corresponds to the 
conscious awareness of the visual environment. This aspect of visual perception 
belongs to the phenomenal domain, which is constituted by phenomenal or 
perceived entities. These entities have geometric and photometric attributes that 
correspond to geometric and photometric attributes of entities of the distal and 
proximal domain. Thus the phenomenal objects have the attributes of 
phenomenal or perceived size, shape, location, orientation and color. The 
relation of phenomenal attributes and corresponding distal and proximal 
attributes is one of the key topics of this paper. 
Since the main function of the visual system is to enable the cognition of 
the distal environment, the phenomenal attributes of dominant interest are 
distally oriented. Thus 'perceived size' primarily refers to the conscious 
impression of distal size of environmental objects; this notion will be referred to 
as 'perceived distal size'. However, there also exists a class of phenomenal 
attributes that are proximally oriented. Thus in addition to 'perceived distal size' 
there is also a phenomenal attribute that will be referred to as 'perceived 
proximal size'. The distinction between perceived distal and proximal attributes 
can be made for all attributes that will be discussed in this paper. The perceived 
proximal attributes are rarely attended to in everyday life, but their neglect can 
lead to serious confusions in both experimental studies and theoretical 
discussions. Their role and relation to perceived distal attributes will be 
discussed and elaborated upon in appropriate sections later on. The totality of 
perceived distal attributes constitutes the visual world, and the totality of 
perceived proximal attributes constitutes the visual field (Gibson, 1950).  
 
B. Measurement of visual attributes 
 
The values of geometric and photometric attributes in the distal  and 
proximal  domain, for any concrete distal scene or proximal image, can be 
ascertained or calculated with more or less routine physical and mathematical 
methods. For example, distal sizes can be measured with measuring tapes or 
more complex geodesic procedures, spectral distributions can be ascertained 
with spectrophotometers, projected angles can be calculated on the basis of the 
laws of projective geometry, etc.   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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The establishment of values of phenomenal attributes, on the other hand, is 
a psychological problem with a long and partly controversial history. In the 
following I will mainly refer to a basic form of psychological measurement, and 
that is the establishment of equality of phenomenal attributes. Three aspects of 
psychological measurement will be noted here: matching methods, types of 
instructions, and presentations conditions. 
Matching methods. Equality of phenomenal attributes is investigated by 
psychophysical matching procedures. In these experiments subjects are usually 
presented with an object, the fixed or standard stimulus, which has a given value 
of the attribute that is studied. They are asked to find a matching stimulus, that 
is, an object, which has the same value of the relevant attribute. There are two 
basic matching methods, depending on the manner of the establishment of the 
value of the matching stimulus among different comparison stimuli. The 
difference is whether the comparison stimulus is variable or constant during an 
experimental trial. 
The first possibility is that the subject manipulates a variable comparison 
stimulus until it perceptually matches the standard stimulus with respect to the 
relevant attribute. For example, in the case of size perception, the subject 
observes a standard line of fixed length and varies, through some device, the 
length of a variable-length line until it is perceived to have the same size as the 
standard. The second possibility is that the comparison stimuli are constant. In 
one variant, the subject chooses  a matching stimulus from an array of 
comparison stimuli presented by the experimenter. For example, a set of lines of 
different lengths is presented, and the subject chooses the one that looks the 
same size as the standard line. In another variant, many trials are used in which 
the standard stimulus is compared to a single comparison stimulus, and subjects 
are asked to report whether the comparison stimulus exhibits a smaller or a 
larger value of the attribute. The distal attribute of the comparison stimuli in 
different trials is varied according to a prescribed schedule. For example, within 
a trial the standard line is compared with a single comparison line, whose length 
is different in different trials. On the basis of results of many such trials the 
experimenter calculates the estimated value of the attribute of the comparison 
stimulus that perceptually matches the attribute of the standard stimulus. 
In addition to the procedures described above, which involve 'matching-to-
standard', a different method is also sometimes used, involving 'matching-to-
norm'. The difference is that in the latter type the standard stimulus is not 
actually presented to the subjects. Instead, it is described as a perceptual norm, 
which the comparison stimulus should fulfill. For example, a comparison line of 
variable orientation is presented, and the subjects are asked to adjust its 
orientation until the line is perceived to be vertical; note that in such a procedure 
no visible standard line of vertical orientation is actually displayed to the 
subjects. This is an example of usage of an orientation norm. Other uses of this Dejan Todorović   
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method include the task of setting a point to lie in the straight-ahead direction (a 
direction norm), finding a circle among a set of ellipses (a shape norm), or 
choosing a color which is uniquely yellow (a color norm). 
The matching procedures implicate that the standard stimulus and the 
matching comparison stimulus have, as phenomenal objects, equal values of the 
measured phenomenal attribute. However, it should be noted that the 
experimentally established values are always to a smaller or larger degree 
variable, and that the usual statistical procedures must be applied. Thus by 
'equal' in the phenomenal domain I will in the following always mean 
'approximately equal', whereas by 'non-equal' I will mean 'clearly different'. The 
crucial issue, to be discussed in next sections, is whether equality vs. non-
equality of attributes in the phenomenal domain, as established by psycho-
physical matching procedures, corresponds to equality vs. non-equality of 
corresponding attributes in the distal and the proximal domain, as established by 
physical and mathematical measurement procedures. 
Instruction types. As it was noted above, there are two classes of 
phenomenal attributes, corresponding to distal and to proximal attributes. In well 
conducted experimental studies this difference must be taken into account and 
subjects must be explicitly instructed which attributes are to be matched. I will 
refer to the two types of instructions as distally focused and proximally focused, 
and to the subjects' task as distal matching and proximal matching, respectively. 
This distinction will be elaborated later on. As it will be noted below, this 
difference is not always heeded by experimenters, which may lead to results that 
are difficult to interpret. 
Presentation conditions. The visual conditions under which psycho-
physical studies are performed fall on a continuum whose two poles will be 
referred to as visually rich or full-cue, and visually impoverished or reduced-cue 
conditions. Briefly, the first type of condition involves rich, complex and 
articulated displays similar to those in everyday visual surroundings, but 
possibly with insufficient control of some potentially relevant stimulus aspects. 
In contrast, the second type of conditions generally involve fully controlled but 
often very impoverished stimuli that contain simple displays on homogeneous 
background. These conditions will be further elaborated in concrete examples 
below, and similarities and differences of results obtained under the different 
types of conditions will be discussed. 
 
C. Relations between domains 
 
In this section I will focus on some relations between pairs  of visual 
domains: distal and phenomenal, distal and proximal, and proximal and 
phenomenal. The main relations that will be defined and analyzed are   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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concordance and discordance between domains. These relations concern 
equality and non-equality of corresponding attributes in a pair of domains, and 
will be used in the definitions of constancies and illusions. 
The distal and the phenomenal domain. One of the main traditional issues 
in perception research is veridicality. To what extent does our awareness of the 
environment correspond to the outside reality? I will operationalize this issue in 
a manner that appears well suited for the analysis of constancies and illusions. 
The basic idea can be illustrated with a simple example. When two rods have the 
same size and are also perceived to be the same size, or when they have different 
sizes and are also perceived to have different sizes, perception is veridical; 
however, when they are the same size but are perceived to have different sizes, 
or, conversely, when they have different sizes but are perceived to be of the 
same size, perception is non-veridical. 
This idea can be generalized and formalized as follows. Consider two 
entities in the distal domain (such as two distal rods) and a distal attribute (such 
as distal size), and two corresponding entities in the phenomenal domain (the 
two perceived rods) and a corresponding phenomenal attribute (perceived size). 
Furthermore, consider a relation between the distal objects in terms of a distal 
attribute (such as the comparison of distal sizes through physical measurement 
procedures), and a corresponding relation between the phenomenal objects in 
terms of a phenomenal attribute (such as the comparison of phenomenal sizes by 
subjects in a psychophysical study). 
Suppose that for both the distal and the phenomenal relation only two 
outcomes are considered: 'being equal', that is, having approximately the same 
value of the attribute (such as having equal distal or equal phenomenal size), and 
'being non-equal', that is, having clearly different values of the attribute (such as 
having different distal or different phenomenal size). In such a case there are two 
possible states of affairs in the scene, and two possible states of affairs in the 
percept. Consequently, there is a total of four possible situations or 
combinations of states of affairs concerning equality and non-equality of 
attributes in the scene and in the percept. They are: situation I, 'equal in scene / 
equal in percept', situation II, 'equal in scene / non-equal in percept', situation III, 
'non-equal in scene / equal in percept', and situation IV, 'non-equal in scene / 
non-equal in percept'. 
In two of these four situations the structures of the distal and the 
phenomenal states of affairs are in concordance: these are situations I (when the 
attributes of objects are equal, both in the distal and in the phenomenal domain) 
and IV (when the attributes are non-equal in both domains). These are the 
situations in which perception is veridical. Conversely, in the other two 
situations, II and III (when the attributes are equal in one domain but non-equal 
in the other), the structures of the two domains are in discordance, and 
perception is non-veridical. In this way, at least for the present purpose, the Dejan Todorović   
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epistemological issue of veridicality can be based on the notions of cross-domain 
structural concordance and discordance. 
To formalize the above discussion, let the value of the relevant distal 
attribute for the first object be denoted as A1, and for the second object as A2, 
and let the relation of distal equality be denoted as =, and of non-equality as…. 
Let the corresponding attribute values in the phenomenal domain be denoted as 
A1', A2', and the relations of phenomenal equality and non-equality as =', and …'. 
The possible states of affairs in the scene are formalized as A1=A2 and A1…A2, 
whereas in the percept they are formalized as A1' =' A2' and A1' …' A2'. The four 
situations are listed in Figure 4. The domains are concordant if either A1 = A2 
and A1' =' A2' , or A1…A2 and A1' …' A2' hold. The domains are discordant if 
either A1 = A2 and A1' …' A2', or A1…A2 and A1' =' A2' hold. 
The distal and the proximal domain. The notions of concordance and 
discordance can be applied in the study of relations between any two perceptual 
domains. Consider an example in the relation between the distal and the proximal 
domain. When two objects of the same distal size are projected on the retina, and 
their two projections are also of the same, proximal size, then the scene and the 
image are in concordance; this will also be the case when the projections of two 
objects of different sizes also have different sizes. In contrast, when the projections 
of two equal objects have different sizes, or when the projections of two objects of 
different sizes have the same size (both of which may happen when the two objects 
are at different distances from the perceiver), then the two domains are in 
discordance. Thus for the distal and proximal domain the notions of concordance 
and discordance involve distal and proximal equality and non-equality, the study of 
which belongs to the field of perceptually relevant optics. 
 
 
 
 
PHENOMENAL 
 
 
 
 
equal (A1' =' A2') 
 
 
non-equal (A1' …' A2') 
 
equal (A1=A2 ) 
 
I: A1=A2 & A1' =' A2' 
 
II:A1=A2 & A1' …' A2' 
 
 
DISTAL 
 
 
 
non-equal (A1…A2) 
 
 
III:A1…A2 & A1' =' A2'  
 
IV: A1…A2 & A1' …' A2' 
 
Figure 4: Equality and non-equality of attributes in the distal and the phenomenal domain 
   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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The proximal and the phenomenal domain. Concordance and discordance 
can also be considered for the proximal-phenomenal relation. Note that since the 
distal objects affect the organism by way of their retinal projections, it is the 
proximal  stimulus on which initial neural processing is based; further neural 
processing eventually leads to the conscious percept. This chain of events 
suggests a rather close relation between the proximal and the phenomenal 
domain. Roughly said, we should see what is on our retinas. Expressed in the 
current terminology, one would expect a structural concordance between the 
proximal and the phenomenal domain. For example, if the projected sizes of two 
proximal objects are equal (or different), then the perceived sizes of the 
corresponding phenomenal objects should also be equal (or different). If, 
however, the proximal sizes are equal (different), but the corresponding 
phenomenal sizes are different (equal), then the two domains are in discordance. 
As it will be discussed in detail later on, cases of this type are studied with 
special interest by perception researchers.  
 
D. The visual modes 
 
The discussions in the preceding section have involved relations between 
pairs of visual domains. When the mutual concordance-discordance relations 
between all three domains are considered, four basic constellations arise, that 
will be referred to as the visual modes. They are the modes of concordant vision, 
constancy, proximal vision, and illusion. These modes are illustrated in Figure 5. 
Each column corresponds to one of the modes. Row 1 involves an example of a 
geometric attribute, the perception of size, and row 2 involves an example of a 
photometric attribute, the perception of achromatic color. Row 3 depicts the 
constellation of concordance-discordance relations characteristic for each of the 
four modes. 
The first possibility (column 1) is that all three domains are mutually 
concordant. This constellation defines the mode of concordant vision, illustrated 
in the first column in Figure 5.The geometric example involves two lines of the 
same size and at the same distance from the observer; the projections of the two 
lines have equal size, and the lines are also perceived to have equal size. The 
photometric example involves two disks of the same reflectance under the same 
illumination; the luminances of the disks are equal, and the disks are perceived 
to have equal achromatic color. Note that the relevant attributes of the objects in 
both examples are equal in the distal, proximal, and phenomenal domain; this is 
indicated by the expressions 'dist. =', 'prox. =', and 'phen =' in the rounded 
rectangles in the third row. In consequence, all three domains are mutually 
concordant; the relation of concordance is depicted by lines with white arrows at 
both ends. Converse examples of concordant vision would be cases with two Dejan Todorović   
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lines that have different distal, proximal, and phenomenal sizes, or two disks that 
have different distal, proximal, and phenomenal color, because in these cases the 
three domains would also be mutually concordant. 
 
 
 
The second possibility (column 2) is the constancy mode, involving cases 
in which the distal and the phenomenal domain are concordant, but both 
domains are discordant with the proximal domain. In the geometric example, 
one line is positioned at a farther distance; in consequence, the projections of the 
two lines have different size. Nevertheless, in the case of size constancy, the two 
lines are perceived as having the same size. In the photometric example, one 
disk is put under lower illumination; therefore, the two disks have different 
luminances. However, if achromatic color constancy obtains, the disks are 
perceived as having the same color. 
The difference of attributes in the proximal domain is denoted by the 
expression 'prox …' in the third row. In both examples, the proximal domain is 
discordant with both the distal and the phenomenal domain, but the latter two   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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domains are concordant. The relation of discordance is depicted by lines with 
two outgoing fins at both ends. A converse case of this mode obtains in 
examples in which the attributes of objects are different in the distal and 
phenomenal domain, but equal in the proximal domain. Such examples are 
provided by two lines of different size, which are also perceived to have 
different size, but whose projections are equal, or by two disks of different color 
that are perceived as such, but whose luminances are equal. Such cases will be 
discussed later on. 
In both the concordant vision mode and the constancy mode perception is 
veridical, because the distal and the phenomenal domains are in concordance. In 
the remaining two modes, these domains are discordant, and perception is non-
veridical. 
The third possibility (column 3) is that the distal domain is discordant with 
both the proximal and the phenomenal domain, but that the latter two domains 
are concordant. I will call this concordance-discordance constellation the mode 
of proximal vision because the percept is in accord with the proximal stimulus. 
Note that the examples in the third column involve the same situation as in the 
second column, but observed under reduced-cue conditions. In the geometric 
example, only the two lines are visible in the otherwise homogeneous surround. 
In such a case, although the two lines have equal distal sizes ('dist. ='), they are 
perceived as having different sizes ('phen. …'), in accord with the difference of 
their projected sizes ('prox. …'). In the photometric example, only the two disks 
are visible, and the surround is homogeneous. Although their distal color is 
equal, they are perceived as having different color, in accord with their different 
luminance. Converse examples of this mode would involve cases in which the 
attributes are equal in the proximal and phenomenal domain, but different in the 
distal domain. 
The fourth possibility (column 4) is the illusion mode, which involves cases 
in which the distal and the phenomenal domain as well as the proximal and the 
phenomenal domain are discordant, but the distal and the proximal domain are 
concordant. The examples in the fourth column involve the same objects as in 
the first column, but in different contexts. The geometric example involves the 
Müller-Lyer illusion, in which lines of equal distal size ('dist. ='), whose 
projected sizes are also equal ('prox. ='), nevertheless are perceived as having 
different sizes ('phen. …'), due to the addition of differently oriented 'fins' at 
their ends. The photometric example involves simultaneous lightness contrast, 
an illusion in which objects of equal reflectance and equal luminance are 
perceived to have different achromatic color, due to the difference in their 
immediate backgrounds. Thus although the distal and the proximal domain are 
in concordance, both are discordant with the phenomenal domain. Converse Dejan Todorović   
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examples are provided by cases in which object that are different distally and 
proximally, are nevertheless perceived as phenomenally equal. 
Specific cases of the constancy and illusion mode are called constancies 
and illusions. Note that the definitions offered here differ somewhat from the 
usual ones. Both definitions explicitly invoke relations between all three 
perceptual domains. This is different from the usual definition of illusions as 
cases of non-veridical perception, formulated in terms of a relation between the 
distal and the phenomenal domain only. In contrast, I differentiate here between 
two classes of non-veridical perception cases, one belonging to the illusion mode 
and the other belonging to the proximal mode. As it will be shown in the 
following, the majority of phenomena generally labeled as illusions belong to 
the illusion mode, as defined here, although some belong to the proximal mode. 
As for constancies, standard definitions usually do include all three perceptual 
domains, at least implicitly. However, generally only such cases are mentioned 
in which distally equal objects are also phenomenally equal, despite proximal 
inequality; in contrast, the definition here also includes converse cases, in which 
distally unequal objects are correctly perceived as unequal, despite being 
proximally equal. 
Of the four visual modes, the constancy mode and the illusion mode have 
involved most experimental studies and theoretical interest. They differ in that 
constancies are cases of veridical perception whereas illusions are cases of non-
veridical perception. However they share the intriguing feature of proximal-
phenomenal discordance, that is, that the structure of the percept is in discord 
with the structure of the proximal image. This discord is traditionally one of the 
main problems of perceptual research. Why don't we see what is on our retinas? 
For example, how can it be that we perceive that two objects have the same size 
when their proximal sizes are different, or that they have different sizes when 
their proximal sizes are equal? All large-scale perceptual theories have addressed 
issues of this type. As noted at the beginning, this paper does not include a 
review of various explanatory frameworks. Instead, I will systematically present 
the structure of constancies and illusions involving a number of visual attributes. 
Such an overview should provide the basis for a critical examination of various 
theories of these phenomena. 
 
PART II: EXPOSITORY FRAMEWORK 
 
If a perceptual system is to be a useful vehicle for the cognition of the 
environment, attributes of perceived objects should covary to a significant extent 
with relevant external attributes. The task of the visual system would be simple 
if each phenomenal attribute were affected only by the corresponding distal 
attribute or the appropriate proximal attribute. One of the main problems of 
perceptual research is that proximal and phenomenal attributes are not singly but   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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multiply determined. Problems raised by multiple determination are at the core 
of the issues discussed in this paper. 
In order to present the phenomena in a unified manner across all classes of 
visual attributes and visual modes, a common format will be used in this paper. 
This format will be described here in general terms, and will be amply illustrated 
with examples in part III. It basically involves illustrations of the effects of two 
independent variables on a single dependent variable. The first independent 
variable will be referred to as the target variable. This is a distal variable (such 
as distal size, shape, location, orientation, or color), which is generally the object 
of the perceptual act. The second independent variable will be referred to as the 
confound variable; Epstein (1973) uses the term 'orthogonal' variable. This is a 
variable that confounds the effect of the target variable on the dependent 
variable, because it also affects the dependent variable. 
The nature of the confound, and the dependent variable in this presentation 
format is different in examples concerning the constancy and the illusion mode. 
In  constancy  examples the dependent variables are the proximal variables, 
corresponding to the target variables (such as proximal size, shape, location, 
orientation, and color). The confound variables are those distal and postural 
variables (such as distance, orientation, gaze direction, eye orientation, and 
illumination), which, in addition to the target variable, influence the value of the 
proximal variable. 
In illusion examples the dependent variables are the phenomenal variables 
corresponding to the distal and the proximal variables (such as perceived size, 
shape, location, orientation and color). Confound variables are mainly, though 
not only, various types of contextual variables that affect the phenomenal 
variable in addition to the external variables, but that do not affect the proximal 
variable. 
The left side of Figure 6 depicts the relation of the independent variables 
(target and confound) and the dependent variable (proximal) in constancy 
examples. For example, both distal size (target) and distance (confound) affect 
the value of proximal size. The target variable is denoted as T, the confound 
variable as c, and the proximal variable as B. For notational consistence, all 
specific target variables in section III will be denoted in the following with 
Roman capitals, all specific confound variables with Roman small letters, and all 
specific proximal variables with Greek small letters. 
The right side of Figure 6 indicates that for each of the three non-
phenomenal variables on the left side there is a counterpart phenomenal variable, 
denoted with the corresponding primed letter. Thus corresponding to target 
variables there are perceived target variables, denoted as T', corresponding to 
proximal variables there are perceived proximal variables, denoted as B', and 
corresponding to confound variables there are perceived confound variables, 
denoted as c'. For example, in the case of size perception, corresponding to the Dejan Todorović   
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external variable 'distal size' there is a corresponding phenomenal variable 
referred to as 'perceived distal size'. The term 'distal' indicates that the 
phenomenal variable is distally oriented. However, as noted before, and will be 
discussed later on, there are also phenomenal variables that are proximally 
oriented, such as 'perceived proximal size', corresponding to the external 
variable 'proximal size'. Finally, corresponding to the confound variable 
'distance' there is a counterpart phenomenal variable, called 'perceived distance'. 
 
 
proximal perc. proximal
confound
Figure 6:       Variables in studies of
visual constancies and their relations
perc. confound
target perc. target
cc '
ππ '
TT '
 
 
The effects of the target and the confound variable on the dependent 
variable in all constancy and illusion examples will be illustrated according to a 
common scheme that consists of a 2x2 matrix of cells, schematically represented 
in Figure 7. Each of four cells (A, B, C, D) in the matrix contains a diagram 
depicting the effect of one value of the target variable T and one value of the 
confound variable c on the dependent variable. There are two values of the target 
variable (T1, T2), corresponding to columns, two values of the confound variable 
(c1 , c2), corresponding to rows, and four values of the dependent variable, 
corresponding to individual cells. A special characteristics of this scheme is that   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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the values of the target and the confound variable are chosen in such a way that 
the values of the dependent variable in cells A and D are equal. The importance 
of this aspect of the scheme will be clarified later on. 
 
 
 
 
 
TARGET 
 
 
 
 
T1 
 
 
T2 
 
c1 A  B   
 
CONFOUND 
 
  c2 C  D 
 
Figure 7: A scheme for the presentations of effects of the target variable and 
the confound variable on the dependent variable 
 
 
This representational format enables several useful comparisons. The 
comparison of diagrams in row cells, that is, the comparison of cell A and cell B, 
as well as the comparison of cell C and cell D, illustrates the effect of the target 
variable on the dependent variable. The comparison of diagrams in column cells, 
that is, the comparison of cell A and cell C, as well as the comparison of cell B 
and cell D, illustrates the effect of the confound  variable on the dependent 
variable. The comparison of cell A and cell D shows how different combinations 
of values of the target variable and the confound variable may induce equal 
values of the dependent variable. 
Using this 2x2 format the general structure of various perceptual 
phenomena can be exemplified in a simple and consistent manner. Studies of 
constancy and proximal vision often take the following form. The scene in cell A 
characterizes a setup with the standard stimulus, where the relevant variables 
take the values T1 (target), c1 (confound) and pA (proximal). The comparison 
stimulus has a different value, c2, of the confound variable. The task of the 
subject is to perceptually match the comparison stimulus to the standard 
stimulus, with respect to the studied attribute. If the task involves distal 
matching, as in constancy studies, then the distal attribute of the comparison 
stimulus should be equal to the distal attribute of the standard stimulus. Such an 
example is represented in cell C; note that the value of the proximal variable for 
cell C is different than for cell A (BC…BA). If the task involves proximal 
matching, as in proximal vision studies, then the proximal attributes of the two 
stimuli should be equal; such an example is represented in cell D, where BD=BA. Dejan Todorović   
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Studies of illusions can be characterized in the following way. As in studies 
of constancy, a scene, such as in cell A, containing the standard stimulus, is 
contrasted with another scene, such as in cell C, containing the comparison 
stimulus, with the same value of the target variable but a different value, c2, of 
the confound variable. However, in illusion studies the manipulation of the 
confound variable does not affect the value of the proximal variable (thus 
BC=BA), but it does affect the value of the phenomenal variable. The contrast of 
the appearance of two scenes illustrates the effect of the illusion. The task of the 
subject is to manipulate or select the value of the target variable of the 
comparison stimulus, such that, as in the scene in cell D, the perceived value of 
the target variable matches the perceived value of the target variable in the scene 
in cell A. The discrepance in the values of target variables for scenes in cells A 
and D, which are perceptually matched, is a measure of the strength of the 
illusion. The contrast between the distal and the proximal variable, as well as the 
corresponding contrast between the perceived distal and perceived proximal 
variable, although crucial in the studies of constancies, is not essential in studies 
of illusions.   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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Basic aspects of all discussed constancies are presented in Figure 8. For 
each type of constancy, this scheme includes a list of relevant variables (target, 
proximal, and confound), a depiction of their geometrical relation, and an 
analytic expression of this relation. The geometrical relations of the three 
variables are depicted schematically, and are meant to graphically convey the 
roles of the relevant variables in simple, basic cases. The corresponding 
equations mainly have the general form p = f(T, c), expressing the functional 
dependence of the proximal variable p on the target variable T and the confound 
variable c (such as the dependence of proximal size on distal size and distance). Dejan Todorović   
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All subsequent discussions of constancies start with considerations of basic 
variables presented in the corresponding row of Figure 8, and are then 
elaborated using the 2x2 scheme introduced above. This is followed by the 
statement of the central problem, which involves the perceptual effects of the 
confound variable. Next, two types of appropriate phenomenal attributes are 
described, as well as the conditions of presentation which are used when these 
attributes are experimentally studied. After that, basic experimental results are 
briefly recounted. Finally, some relations between perceptual variables are 
considered. Namely, in some cases researchers have hypothesized that, 
corresponding to the functional relation p = f(T, c), holding between the non-
phenomenal variables, an analogous relation of the form p' = f(T',c'), or some 
variant of it, holds in the phenomenal domain. 
 
PART III: CONSTANCIES AND ILLUSIONS 
 
The general considerations presented in Part II will now be concretely 
illustrated with many examples of constancies and illusions. The exposition is 
divided in two parts, the first dealing with geometric attributes and the second 
with photometric attributes. Intrinsic geometric attributes (size and shape) and 
extrinsic geometric attributes (location and orientation) are discussed separately. 
Following that, both achromatic and chromatic aspects of photometric 
perception are discussed. Corresponding distal, proximal, and phenomenal 
attributes and their relations are analyzed for each kind of attribute (size, shape, 
location, orientation, and color). The sections concerning each attribute are 
divided into subsections on constancies and illusions. Each subsection contains 
one or more examples involving the 2x2 scheme introduced above. 
 
A. Perception of extension - intrinsic geometric attributes 
 
Distal size and shape are intrinsic geometric attributes of distal objects. As 
such, they are unaffected when these objects undergo changes of extrinsic 
attributes of location and orientation. Neither are they affected by the 
simultaneous presence of other objects in the scene. However, as will be 
discussed in this section, such circumstances may, in some conditions, affect the 
perception of size and shape. 
 
1. Perception of size 
 
The general structure of size constancies and illusions will be presented in 
this section. These discussions set the format for the subsequent discussions of 
all other constancies and illusions, and will therefore be formulated in more 
detail. Reviews of size constancy research are given by Baird (1970), Hochberg   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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(1971a), Rock (1975), Sedgwick (1986), and Gillam (1995). Reviews of size 
illusions can be found in Robinson (1972), Rock (1975), and Coren & Girgus 
(1978). 
Depending on the domain, three types of size can be distinguished: distal, 
proximal, and phenomenal. Distal size is a relatively simple geometric attribute 
that can be numerically expressed with a single number. It comprises lengths of 
linear extents, areas of portions of 2-D surfaces, and volumes of portions of 
space. Distal size is also referred to as 'objective' or 'physical' or 'bodily' or 
'linear size'. Proximal size refers to the sizes of projections of extended distal 
objects on the retina, expressed in angular terms. It is also called 'angular' or 
'retinal' or 'projective' size. Perceived size refers to the conscious impression of 
external size. As it will be discussed below, it comes in two variants, one 
associated with distal size and the other with proximal size. 
 
(a) Size constancy 
 
Studies of size constancy form a part of size perception research that is 
concerned with perceptual effects of confound variables that affect the proximal 
size of distal objects. There are two such confound variables, distance and slant. 
(i) Size constancy with respect to distance. Target, proximal, and confound 
variables. Several basic aspects of a setup often used in studies of size constancy 
are schematically presented in Figure 8, row 1. It contains a distal object, 
depicted as a vertical line, and an observer, represented by the retina. The target 
variable is the distal size S of the line. The corresponding proximal variable is 
the visual angle a that the projection of the line subtends on the retina; this 
variable is called 'proximal' or 'retinal' or 'angular' size. The confound variable is 
the distance d of the stimulus line, defined as the distance from the nodal point 
to the point where the stimulus line touches the visual axis. Note that in this 
setup the stimulus line is perpendicular to the visual axis. 
The proximal variable, angular size α, depends not only on the target 
variable, distal size S, but also on the confound variable, distance d. The 
dependence of α on both S and d in this setup is expressed analytically by the 
formula α = atan (S/d). For example, a line of distal size S = 1 cm at the distance 
of d = 57 cm subtends a visual angle of α = 1
o on the retina. 
The 2x2 scheme. The relation between the three variables is further 
represented graphically in Figure 9, using the 2x2 scheme introduced in part II. 
The cells in the left column of the figure involve one value (S1) of the size S of 
the stimulus line, and the cells in the right column involve another, larger value 
(S2). Similarly, the cells in the top row of the figure involve one value (d1) of 
distance d of the stimulus line, whereas the cells in the bottom row involve 
another, larger value (d2). Cell A depicts a basic, initial situation. Cell B depicts 
a longer line at the same distance as in cell A. Cell C depicts a line of the same 
length as in cell A but at a larger distance. Finally, cell D depicts the longer line Dejan Todorović   
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at the larger distance. The size and the distance are chosen in such a way that 
αD= αA, that is, the proximal size in cell D is the same as in cell A. 
The comparison of cells A and B (and also of C and D) illustrates the 
dependence of proximal size on distal size: an increase of distal size causes an 
increase of proximal size (i.e., αB >αA, αD >αC) The comparison of cells A and C 
(and also of B and D) illustrates the dependence of proximal size on distance: an 
increase of distance causes a decrease of proximal size (i.e., αC<αA, αD<αB). 
Thus proximal size varies directly with distal size but inversely with distance. 
The comparison of cells A and D shows that different distal sizes may project 
into the same proximal size, a fact inverse to the fact that the same distal size 
may project into different proximal sizes. Both facts illustrate cases of distal-
proximal discordance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceptual effects of the confound variable. The foregoing discussion has 
involved only the relations between the distal and the proximal domain, and was 
purely geometrical. The crucial issue in the present context, however, is the 
perception of size. The relations between the external domains and the 
phenomenal domain are probed in psychophysical experiments in which subjects 
are asked to match the size of a comparison stimulus to the size of the given   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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standard stimulus. The critical factor in such studies is the value of the confound 
variable, that is, the distance of the stimuli from the observer. 
If the comparison stimulus is at the same distance as the standard stimulus, 
then the scene and the image are in concordance: two objects of equal (different) 
distal sizes also have equal (different) proximal sizes. If the two objects are also 
perceived as having equal (different) size, then all three domains are in 
concordance. However, this is not necessarily the case. As it is shown in the 
section on size illusions, if two lines are equally long and at the same distance, 
but if their contexts are different, or if they differ in location or orientation, the 
perceptual equality may not hold. 
The central issues discussed in this section arise in experiments in which 
the standard and the comparison stimulus are at different distances. In such cases 
a basic dilemma arises. Suppose that the standard stimulus is the line in cell A, at 
distance d1, and that the comparison stimulus is at distance d2. Which line, at 
distance d2, will be chosen to match the standard? To state two basic 
possibilities, will the stimulus that the subjects choose as perceptually equal be 
similar to the standard in distal size (such as the line in cell C), or in proximal 
size (such as the line in cell D)? The answer is not quite straightforward, and it 
depends on the meaning of the term 'perceived size' and on the conditions of 
stimulus presentation. 
Two types of phenomenal variables. The notion of 'perceived (or 
phenomenal) size' has two senses. The first, and dominant sense, refers to the 
conscious impression of the distal size of environmental objects, that is, to size 
as measured by rulers or measuring tapes. The second sense refers to the 
conscious impression of pure visual extent, or the amount of visual field covered 
by an object. This notion is rarely used in everyday speech. However, it is this 
second sense of phenomenal size which is used when it is said that 'distant 
objects appear smaller' or when one notes that the moon can be masked by a 
fingernail. Thus when two objects of equal distal size are at different distances 
(as in the examples in cells A and C), observers generally perceive that they 
have the same distal size, but they may at the same time also note that the more 
distant object covers a smaller extent of the visual field than the nearer one, and 
is in that sense smaller. Conversely, two objects may be perceived to have 
different distal sizes, but nevertheless cover the same visual extent (such as in 
the case of the moon and the fingernail, or in the examples in cells A and D), and 
have in that sense equal size. 
The distally oriented sense of the term 'perceived size' will be referred to as 
perceived distal size, and will be denoted as S' (as the phenomenal counterpart to 
S, the distal size). The proximally oriented sense of 'perceived size' will be 
referred to as perceived proximal size, and will be denoted as α' (as the 
phenomenal counterpart to α, the proximal size). Other term pairs used to denote 
this distinction include 'visual world size' vs 'visual field size' (Gibson, 1950), Dejan Todorović   
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and 'apparent absolute size' vs 'apparent angular size' (Joynson, 1949). Both 
senses of perceived size are externally oriented, that is, they are both 
phenomenal correlates of physically specifiable attributes, one distal and the 
other proximal. Although in everyday life the distal sense is almost exclusively 
used, the proximal sense can readily be noticed and attended to, once it is 
pointed out. 
Note that our oculomotor systems are not guided by distal but by proximal 
size: when I look from one end of an object to the other, the amount of my eye 
rotation is guided, quite sensibly, by the proximal and not by the distal size of 
the object. Thus although I may note that objects in cells A and C have equal 
distal sizes, my eye excursions while inspecting them will be larger for the 
object in cell A than the object in cell C. 
In size perception studies subjects are asked to match the comparison 
stimulus to the standard stimulus with respect to size. Since 'perceived size' does 
not have a unitary sense, it is clearly recommendable that the instructions to 
subjects explicitly indicate which attribute the experimenter has in mind. 
Distally focused instructions should stress that the matching comparison 
stimulus that 'looks the same size' as the standard stimulus should be objectively 
equal to the standard, e.g., when measured with a ruler. In contrast, proximally 
focused instructions, attempting to elicit judgements of perceived proximal size, 
are trickier to formulate. One possibility is to ask for a matching stimulus which 
would exactly mask the standard stimulus or could be visually superimposed 
upon it. Or, it can be required that the matching stimulus should be such that, if a 
photograph would be made of the standard and variable stimulus from the 
vantage point of the subject, their sizes, as measured on the photograph, would 
be equal (Gilinsky, 1955). 
Sometimes instructions have been used which are unfocused, as when 
subjects are asked to produce the match according to the way the sizes of the 
stimuli 'look' or 'appear' to them, without more explicit explanations. The 
motivation for such instructions is the attempt to avoid possible cognitive biases 
that may be induced by distally or proximally focused instructions. However, 
these 'apparent' or 'look' instructions may be confusing. Given such instructions, 
the subjects are in fact left to decide what it is that the experimenter asks them to 
do. Different subjects understand such instructions in different ways, or may 
attend more to one than to the other aspect of perceived size (Joynson, 1949, 
1958a,b; Joynson & Kirk, 1960). Furthermore, the same subject may change the 
response criterion during the experiment, or may try, within a single trial, to 
achieve a compromise of the two senses of perceived size. All of this may lead 
to average matches, which are intermediate between distal and proximal size, but 
are difficult to interpret.   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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Given unequivocally focused instructions, the task of the subject can be 
formalized as follows. Let the distal sizes of the standard and the comparison 
stimulus be denoted as Ss and Sc, and their proximal sizes as αs and α c , 
respectively. Let the corresponding phenomenal attributes be denoted as S's, S'c, 
α's, and α'c. Distally focused instructions ask subjects to perceptually match the 
standard and the comparison stimulus with respect to distal size, in other words, 
to set S'c =' S's. Proximally focused instructions ask subjects to perceptually 
match the standard and the comparison stimulus with respect to proximal size, in 
other words, to set α'c =' α's. Perfect size constancy obtains if the distal size of 
the matching comparison stimulus is equal to the distal size of the standard, that 
is, if Sc = Ss. Perfect proximal matching obtains if the proximal size of the 
matching stimulus is equal to the proximal size of the standard, that is, if αc = αs.  
Size constancy is a case of veridical perception, as defined above, because 
the distal and the phenomenal domain are in concordance. In contrast, proximal 
vision, in which objects of equal proximal size are perceived as equal, although 
they are distally different, is a case of non-veridical perception, because the 
distal and the phenomenal domain are in discordance. However, such a 
definition of veridicality is problematic in studies using proximally focused 
instructions. This is because in such studies subjects are specifically asked to 
disregard distal sizes and to perform matches in terms of proximal sizes. It 
would be awkward to label the outcomes of such studies as instances of non-
veridical perception, because the subjects are not aiming for the goal of distal-
phenomenal concordance. One terminological possibility is to distinguish 
between  distal  veridicality, as the goal of distally focused instructions and 
involving the constancy mode, and proximal  veridicality, as the goal of 
proximally focused instructions, and involving the proximal vision mode. 
Conditions of presentation. As noted before, in psychophysical experiments 
two basic types of presentation conditions are used, the reduced-cue and the full-
cue conditions. When the reduced-cue conditions are used in size perception 
studies, the main concern is the availability of cues to the value of distance, the 
confound variable. In order to reduce many potential indicators of distance and 
depth, some, though not necessarily all of the following may hold: the whole 
visual field is homogeneous (in order to reduce contextual cues), except for the 
presented stimuli, which are generally textureless (to reduce slant cues), and 
have simple geometrical shapes such as lines or disks, for which no particular 
size is characteristic (to reduce familiarity cues). The stimuli are viewed 
monocularly (to reduce retinal disparity cues), through an artificial pupil (to 
reduce accommodation cues), without observer motion (to reduce parallax cues), 
and for a short time. The other type of visual presentation conditions is the full-Dejan Todorović   
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cue condition, that is, a more or less natural viewing situation in which some, 
though not necessarily all standard distance cues are available.  
Basic experimental results. The results of size perception studies depend on 
presentation conditions. Under completely reduced-cue conditions the 
comparison stimulus that the subjects match to the standard stimulus is generally 
such that its proximal size is fairly close to the proximal size of the standard, 
regardless of the distal sizes of the two stimuli (Lichten & Lurie, 1950; Hastorf 
& Way, 1952; Epstein, 1963; Rock & McDermott, 1964), even with distally 
focused instructions (Over, 1960). This is a natural outcome, because, when all 
cues to distance are eliminated, the proximal size remains as the main anchor 
that subjects can use for matching. Such results belong to the proximal vision 
mode, because the phenomenal attributes are in concordance with the proximal 
attributes, but both are in discordance with the distal attributes. 
Under  full-cue conditions, results depend on instructions. With distally 
focused instructions, the matching stimuli are generally such that their distal 
sizes are fairly close to the distal sizes of the standard stimuli, except that often 
(though not always) 'overconstancy' is obtained, that is, the matching sizes are 
consistently somewhat larger (distally) than the standard (Martius, 1889; 
Holway & Boring, 1941; Smith, 1953; Gilinsky, 1955; Jenkin, 1959; Carlson, 
1960; Baird & Biersdorf, 1967). With proximally focused  instructions  the 
perceptually matching comparison sizes roughly correlate with the proximal 
sizes of the standard stimuli. However, the matching proximal sizes tend to be 
significantly larger than the standard proximal sizes. Furthermore, the results 
tend to be much more variable than results with distally focused instructions 
(Gilinsky, 1955; Epstein 1963; Carlson & Tassone, 1967; Leibowitz & Harvey, 
1967). 
If one believes that perception of distal size is generally veridical, then the 
departures from constancy must be explained. As noted above, matching values 
intermediate between distal and proximal sizes ('under-constancy') may be due 
to unfocused instructions. On the other hand, 'overconstancy' results may be due 
to conscious strategies of subjects who 'know that distant objects appear smaller' 
and therefore try to counter this tendency by choosing larger matching 
comparison stimuli (Carlson, 1960; Rock, 1975). However, rather than blaming 
unfocused instructions or misguided subject strategies, the possibility remains 
that distal size perception is not completely veridical, and that size constancy 
might fail to obtain due to genuine perceptual causes. Similar considerations 
apply to studies of proximal size. Judgements of visual angle may fail to agree 
with objective proximal size due to insufficiently clear instructions, special 
subject strategies, or perceptual causes.   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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Perception of the confound variable. As depicted in general terms in Figure 
6, each of the three external variables that play a role in size constancy studies 
(distal size, proximal size, distance) has a corresponding phenomenal variable. 
The previous paragraphs have dealt with some issues concerning perceived 
distal size (S'), and perceived proximal size (α'). The third phenomenal variable, 
perceived distance, denoted here as d', is a topic of long-standing interest in 
vision research. A large number of variables that affect perceived distance have 
been identified (Cutting & Vishton, 1995). Perception of distance will not be 
dealt with in any detail in this paper. However, some of its aspects related to 
perception of size will be treated briefly in the following paragraphs. Distance 
perception is only occasionally directly assessed in studies of size constancy, 
which is unfortunate, because perceived distance is explicitly invoked in some 
theories of size perception. 
Relations between variables. As noted above, the equation expressing the 
geometrical relationship of distal size S, distance d, and proximal size α, takes 
the form α=atan(S/d). A simplified form is given by α=S/d, which is, for small 
values of α, an appropriate approximation. This formula expresses a simple 
geometrical truth concerning the relation of three external variables. Some 
theories of size and distance perception propose that similar relationships hold 
between corresponding phenomenal variables. One such proposal takes the form 
α'=S'/d' (McCready, 1986). Thus in a study in which judgements of proximal 
size, distal size, and distance are collected, the obtained proximal size estimates 
should be approximately equal to the ratio of the obtained estimates of distal size 
and distance. An extensive study along these lines, in which values of all three 
phenomenal variables are collected, appears not to have been performed. 
Another, and more usual variant of this idea is the 'size-distance invariance 
hypothesis', which takes the form α=S'/d'; note that, in comparison to the 
previous formula, here proximal size α replaces perceived proximal size α' 
(Kilpatrick & Ittelson, 1953; Epstein, Park, & Casey, 1961; Sedgwick, 1986). 
Such a relationship between phenomenal attributes is to be expected in cases of 
veridical perception of size and distance. However, the formula also furnishes 
some predictions when perception is non-veridical. First, consider the case of 
two distal stimuli, whose proximal sizes are equal (α 1 = α 2). If the perceived 
distal size of the first stimulus is, veridically or non-veridically, larger, equal, or 
smaller than the perceived distal size of the second stimulus (S1' > S2', S1' = S2', 
S1' < S2'), then, according to the hypothesis, the perceived distance of the first 
stimulus should be correspondingly, veridically or non-veridically, larger, equal, 
or smaller than the perceived distance of the second stimulus (d1' > d2', d1' = d2', 
d1' < d2'), in order for their ratio to stay constant. Second, suppose that the two 
stimuli have different proximal sizes (α 1>α 2). If their perceived distal sizes are 
equal (S1' = S2'), then the perceived distance of the first stimulus should be Dejan Todorović   
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smaller than the perceived distance of the second stimulus (d1' < d2'), whereas if 
their perceived distances are equal (d1' = d2'), then the perceived distal size of the 
first stimulus should be larger than the perceived distal size of the second one 
(S1' > S2'), regardless of veridicality. 
Empirical support for the size-distance invariance hypothesis is equivocal 
(see Epstein, Park & Casey, 1961; Sedgwick, 1986). However, some data are 
clearly qualitatively consistent with this type of relationship between perceived 
distal size and perceived distance. An example is furnished by the well-known 
perceptual distortions in Ames' room (Ittelson, 1952). The rear wall of this room 
is objectively slanted in depth with respect to the perceiver, so that one of its 
back corners is objectively at a smaller distance than the other; therefore, if two 
objects of equal distal size are located in each corner, their proximal sizes are 
different, the one in the objectively nearer corner projecting a larger image (α 1 > 
α 2). However, the rear wall of Ames' room is, due to some, not generally 
agreed-upon cause, nonveridically perceived to be frontoparallel with respect to 
the observer, and thus the two back corners, and objects located near them, 
appear to be at equal distance (d1' = d2'). In accord with the above hypothesis, 
rather than veridically perceiving two objects of equal distal size located at 
different distances, observers perceive two objects of different distal size (S1' > 
S2') located at the same distance. A converse example concerns the percepts of 
the vertical edges of the back corners. The vertical edge of the nearer back 
corner in Ames' room is shorter, but both edges project equally long images (α 1 
= α 2). However, as they are perceived to have equal distances (d1' = d2'), they 
are also perceived to have equal sizes (S1' = S2'). Within the present framework, 
these effects belongs to the mode of proximal vision, because objects of equal 
(different) proximal size also have equal (different) perceived sizes, although 
their distal sizes are different (equal).  
(ii) Size constancy with respect to slant. Target, proximal, and confound 
variable. Distance from the observer is not the only confound variable that, in 
addition to distal size, affects proximal size. Row 2 in Figure 8 depicts the 
dependence of proximal size on the slant of the distal object. Slant is defined 
here as the angle of inclination, i, of the object with respect to the perpendicular 
to the visual axis. The corresponding equation expresses the dependence of 
proximal size on distal size, distance, and slant. For example, a line of distal size 
S = 1 cm, slanted by angle i = 60
o and at distance d = 57 cm, subtends an angle 
of size α = 0.5
 o. In case of slant i = 0, the equation reduces to the previous case 
in which the stimulus line is perpendicular to the visual axis. 
The 2x2 scheme. The dependence of proximal size on slant is also depicted 
with the help of the 2x2 scheme in Figure 10. The graphs in cells A and B are 
the same as in Figure 9, in which slant is zero. The cells C and D involve the 
same lines as in cells A and B, respectively, but with non-zero slant. The distal   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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sizes and slants are chosen in such a way that the proximal size is the same for 
lines in cells A and D. 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of row cells (A vs B and C vs D) illustrates again the effect of 
distal size on proximal size. Comparison of column cells (A vs C and B vs D) 
shows that increases of slant induce decreases of proximal size. Comparison of 
diagonal cells, A and D, shows how differences in distal size may be 
compensated by differences in slant, inducing equal proximal sizes. 
Perceptual effects of the confound variable. Dependence of proximal size 
on slant is formally analogous to the dependence of proximal size on distance, 
and raises related perceptual questions. If two objects have equal slants then the 
distal and the proximal domain are in concordance: object equal (different) in 
distal size will also be equal (different) in proximal size. The crucial issues arise 
for objects of different slant. Given a standard stimulus of one slant, for example 
as in cell A, and a variable stimulus of different slant, will the perceptually 
matching comparison stimulus agree with the standard in distal size, as in cell C, 
or in proximal size, as in cell D?  
Basic experimental results. Unfortunately, the dependence of perceived 
size of linear extents on slant has received little experimental attention. The 
exception is the perception of objects lying horizontally on the ground, Dejan Todorović   
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stretching away from the observer, viewed at an angle from above, perceived 
under full-cue conditions, and studied with distally focused instructions: such 
extents appear as shorter than extents of equal length in vertical orientation 
(Wagner, 1985; Toye, 1986; Higashiyama & Ueyama, 1988; Levin & Haber, 
1993; Norman, Todd, Perotti & Tittle, 1996). However, the manipulation of 
slant has received much more attention in the study of figures more complex 
than lines. This aspect will be dealt with in the section on shape perception. 
 
(b) Size illusions 
 
In the discussions of size constancy the focus was on problems raised for 
size perception by confound variables such as distance and slant, whose 
variations affect proximal size. I will now discuss a second set of problems 
involved in size perception, raised by a class of confound variables that do not 
affect proximal size but do affect perceived size. Size illusions involve 
phenomena in which objects of equal distal and proximal size nevertheless have 
different perceived sizes, or, conversely, cases in which objects of different 
distal and proximal size nevertheless have equal perceived sizes. 
As noted in part II, the representational format for the description of size 
(and all other) illusions is similar to the one used for constancies. It involves the 
effect of a target and a confound variable on a dependent variable, demonstrated 
using a 2x2 scheme. The target variable is distal size. The dependent variable is 
not proximal size (as in size constancy studies) but perceived size. The values of 
distal size and the values of the confound variables are chosen such that the 
perceived sizes in cells A and D of the 2x2 scheme are approximately equal. 
Effects of three types of confound variables will be demonstrated. 
In studies of size illusions, the variables 'distance' and 'slant', which are 
confound variables in studies of size constancy, are either held constant or their 
manipulation does not affect proximal size. Thus stimuli of equal (or different) 
distal size also have equal (or different) proximal size. In other words, the distal 
and the proximal domain are in concordance, and the distinction between distal 
and proximal size is not essential for the purpose of the discussion of the 
structure of results. Similarly, the distinction between perceived distal and 
perceived proximal size is generally not used in size illusion studies. Analogous 
considerations apply for other illusions. 
(i) The dependence of perceived size on context. Many visual illusions can 
be described within a context vs. no-context framework. That is, the comparison 
is between stimuli presented in isolation and the same stimuli presented 
simultaneously with some other stimuli. Since the original stimulus is physically 
unchanged by the addition of context, it has identical distal size in both cases. A 
variant of this framework is the comparison of perceptual attributes of stimuli   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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presented in two different contexts. This is in fact the more general case, since 
no-context can be regarded as a special case of context. 
An example of a size illusion presented in the 'context vs. no-context' 
framework is depicted Figure 11. Cells A and B contain two lines presented in 
isolation, with the second one objectively (distally and proximally) shorter. Cells 
C and D contain the same lines, but with the addition of several shorter lines 
('fins'). Such stimuli are known as 'fins-out' versions of the Müller-Lyer figures. 
Distal size is the target variable, and the presence of context is the confound 
variable. Note that all stimuli have approximately the same distance and slant 
with respect to the observer. 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of row cells (A vs B and C vs D) illustrates the trivial fact that 
perceived size depends on distal size. Comparison of column cells (A vs C and B 
vs D) illustrates the interesting fact that perceived size depends on the presence 
of context. 
In psychophysical matching studies of this effect, when the adjustment 
procedure is used subjects are asked to adjust the length of a comparison line 
without context until it looks the same size as a standard line in the fins-out 
context, or vice versa. Another possibility is to use the selection procedure and Dejan Todorović   
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to present an array of lines of different lengths without context and to ask the 
subject to pick out the one which looks the same size as a particular standard line 
in the fins-out context, or vice versa. Whatever the procedure, the phenomenally 
matching line usually has a different distal size than the standard. The 
discrepancy of distal sizes is a measure of the strength of the illusion. 
As it can be seen in the figure, lines without context look shorter than lines 
of equal length in the fins-out context. For example, the line in cell A looks 
shorter than the objectively equally long line in cell C. In contrast, the line in 
cell A looks approximately equal in length to the line in cell D, although the 
latter is objectively shorter. 
An example of the 'different contexts' framework is presented in figure 12, 
featuring both 'fins-in' and 'fins-out' version of the Müller-Lyer figures. Cells A 
and B contain lines of different lengths, both with fins in, and cells C and D 
contain the same lines but with fins out. It can be seen that lines with fins in look 
shorter than the same lines with fins out. Note that lines in cell A and cell D look 
approximately equally long, although the latter is in fact objectively 25% 
shorter. This percentage is a measure of the strength of the illusion. Many figural 
variants and quantitative parameters of this illusion were studied (see reviews in 
Coren & Girgus, 1978, and Robinson, 1972). 
 
 
 
The Müller-Lyer illusion is only one among many contextually 
dependent size illusions. Some of them involve linear extents (Sander   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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illusion, Ponzo illusion, Opel-Kundt illusion) whereas other involve figure 
areas (Ebbinghaus illusion, Delboef illusion, Jastrow illusion). They can all 
be represented in the 2x2 format used above. 
 Note that in all examples the comparison of column cells (A vs C and 
B vs D), shows that lines of equal external (distal and proximal) size may 
have different perceived size, whereas the comparison of cells A and D 
shows that lines of different distal and proximal size may have equal 
perceived size. Thus in all these cases the distal and the proximal domain 
are in concordance, but both are discordant with the phenomenal domain, 
which is the characteristic of the illusion mode. 
(ii) The dependence of perceived size on orientation. As it was shown 
in the section on size constancy, manipulation of slant of lines (the angle 
with respect to the visual axis) changes their proximal size. There is 
another component of line orientation, the tilt, whose variation preserves 
proximal size. Consider the simple case of a line belonging to the view-
normal plane, defined here as any plane that is perpendicular to the visual 
axis. The slant of such a line is zero. If the line is rotated about the visual 
axis (as, for example, the hand of a clock rotates about the center), its 
spatial orientation will change. However, it will remain in the view-normal 
plane, its slant will stay zero, and its proximal size (the length of its 
projection on the retina) will stay constant. The aspect of orientation that 
does change with such a manipulation is defined here as the line's tilt. As it 
will be discussed in more detail in the section on perception of orientation, 
tilt can be defined by the angle that the line subtends with respect to some 
reference orientation, such as the vertical or the horizontal orientation. 
Note that when a line with non-zero slant is subjected to the same 
manipulation (rotation about the visual axis), its slant and proximal size 
will also remain unchanged. For such lines tilt can be defined as equal to 
the tilt of their projection upon the view-normal plane. However, such 
cases were rarely studied in experiments concerned with size illusions, and 
I will only consider zero slant lines in the following. 
Although the manipulation of tilt does not change a line's proximal 
size, it may change its perceived size. The dependence of the phenomenal 
variable 'perceived size' on the target variable 'distal size' and the confound 
variable 'orientation' is illustrated in Figure 13. The lines in cells A and B 
are both in horizontal orientation, but the second one is slightly shorter. 
Corresponding lines of equal size are presented in cells C and D in vertical 
orientation. 
 Dejan Todorović   
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The effect of distal size on perceived size is again illustrated in the 
comparison of row cells (A vs B and C vs D). The comparison of column 
cells (A vs C and B vs D), on the other hand, shows that orientation also 
affects perceived size, though to a small extent: the horizontal lines look 
slightly shorter than the corresponding vertical lines of equal objective size. 
Thus the line in cell A looks shorter than the line in cell C, although their 
distal sizes are equal, whereas it looks approximately equal in size to the 
line in cell D, although its distal size is slightly longer. The difference in 
objective size of perceptually equally long lines in cells A and D is a 
measure of the strength of the effect. 
The presented effect is a variant of the 'vertical-horizontal' illusion. 
Note that when the head is tilted 90
o the perceived length relations are 
reversed, and the objectively horizontal line looks longer than the 
objectively vertical line. Thus the relevant variable is not the exocentric, 
environment-relative orientation, but the orientation of the line on the 
subjects retina (see review in Robinson, 1972) 
   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
  161
 
 
 (iii) The dependence of perceived size on location. Perceived size depends 
to some extent on the retinal locus that it is projected upon. This is illustrated in 
Figure 14. The effect is not demonstrated directly, as in previous two illusions, 
but indirectly, by depicting the situation in which it occurs, as in the constancy 
examples. Cell A depicts a situation in which the projection of an distal line is 
centered on the fovea; the inset in the lower right-hand corner depicts the 
corresponding retinal projection. Cell B depicts a distally longer line at the same 
distance, whose proximal length is also longer. Cell C depicts a situation in 
which the line from cell A is rotated about the vertical axis through the nodal 
point into a new position so that it projects onto the periphery of the retina. In 
cell D the same manipulation is performed on the line from cell B. Note that, in 
contrast to the examples in the section on size constancy, this manipulation 
preserves proximal size: the projections of lines in cells A and B have the same 
size as the projections of lines in cells C and D, respectively. 
Experiments using similar manipulations have shown that extents projected 
at peripheral locations look shorter than extents of equal distal size, which are 
projected more centrally. Thus the line in cell A would look longer than the line 
in cell C. Conversely, the line in cell A would look approximately equally long 
as the line in cell D, although the latter is distally and proximally longer 
(Hillebrand, 1928; Schneider et al., 1978). 
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2. Perception of shape 
 
Three kinds of shape will be considered, distal, proximal and 
phenomenal. Distal shape is a relatively complex mathematical property. I 
will only consider the shapes of lines and contours of 2-D figures, because 
such shapes were predominantly used in studies of shape constancies and 
illusions.  Proximal  shape is the shape of projections of distal lines and 
contours upon the retina. I will disregard the fact that the retina is a curved 
surface and that the projections are thus also curved to a smaller or greater 
extent. Phenomenal shape comes in two variants, as perceived distal shape 
and perceived proximal shape. 
Reviews of shape constancy are provided by Epstein & Park (1963) and 
Sedgwick (1986). Many shape illusions are presented by Coren & Girgus 
(1978) and Robinson (1972). 
 
(a) Shape constancy 
 
Target, proximal, and confound variables. When an external object is 
projected on the retina, its distal shape is projected into the proximal shape. 
However, the structure of the proximal shape is affected not only by the distal 
shape, as the target variable, but also by the slant of the object with respect to 
the visual axis, as the confound variable. 
The 2x2 scheme. The dependence of proximal shape on distal shape and 
slant is presented in Figure 15. In cell A, a circular figure is viewed by an 
observer whose visual axis is perpendicular to the plane of the circle. The 
proximal shape, also a circle, is represented in the inset in the lower right-
hand corner of cell A. In cell B another distal shape, a vertically elongated 
ellipse, is presented as the distal object; this is also the shape of the 
corresponding projection. In cell C the shape from cell A is slanted with 
respect to the visual axis. As a consequence, the corresponding proximal 
shape is a horizontally elongated ellipse. Finally, in cell D the second shape 
is also slanted, and its projected shape is circular, the same as the projected 
shape in cell A. 
   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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Comparison of row cells (A vs B and C vs D) illustrates the effect of 
variation of distal shape on the variation of proximal shape. Comparison of 
column cells (A vs C and B vs D) illustrates the effect of slant on proximal 
shape. Comparison of cells A and D illustrates how different shapes at 
different slants may project into the same proximal shape. 
Perceptual effects of the confound variable. The foregoing discussion 
has involved only geometrical considerations. Their relevance for perception 
involves the effect of slant on perceived shape. There are two basic 
possibilities concerning slant. The first is that two shapes are presented at 
equal slants, as in cells A and B. In this case the scene and the image are 
concordant, and shapes that are distally equal (different) are proximally equal 
(different) as well. In cases of concordant vision, the two shapes are also 
perceived as equal (different). However, as will be illustrated in the section 
on shape illusions, equal shapes at equal slants may look different in different 
contexts. 
The other possibility, which is the main issue to be considered in this 
section, is the perception of shapes presented at different slants. Then a basic 
dilemma arises, formally identical to the one in size perception: do subjects 
match objects in terms of their distal shapes or their proximal shapes? Given 
the figure in cell A as a standard, will the corresponding figure of matching 
perceived shape be the one in cell C, with equal distal but different proximal 
shape, or the one in cell D, with equal proximal but different distal shape? Dejan Todorović   
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The answer depends on the meaning of the term 'perceived shape' as well as 
on presentation conditions. 
Two types of phenomenal variables. Similar to 'perceived size', the 
notion of 'perceived shape' has two senses, referred to here as perceived distal 
shape and perceived proximal shape. The first phenomenal attribute 
expresses the sense of 'shape' used in everyday life, and refers to the 
impression of an intrinsic geometric characteristic of objects that is 
independent of their position in space. In contrast, the second phenomenal 
attribute refers to the impression of the shape of the portion of the visual field 
covered by the object. This attribute changes with the change of object slant. 
Thus although subjects may declare that the disks in cells A and C have equal 
perceived distal shape, they may at the same time also note that the first disk 
covers a circular portion of the visual field whereas the second disk covers an 
elliptical portion of the visual field; thus the perceived proximal shapes of the 
two disks would be different. Conversely, disks in cells A and D would have 
different perceived distal shapes but similar perceived proximal shapes, 
because they cover equally shaped portions of the visual field. The 
conceptual distinction between two types of perceived space is also denoted 
by the contrast between the terms 'perceived objective shape' vs perceived 
'projective shape' (see Sedgwick, 1986). 
Note that it is not the distal shapes but the proximal shapes that guide 
oculomotor behavior. When I let my gaze glide along the perimeters of the 
disks in cell A and cell C, my eye motions will be approximately circular for 
the disk in cell A and approximately elliptical for the disk in cell C, even 
though I may perceive their distal shape to be identical. 
As in the case of perceived size, the duality of the concept of perceived 
shape necessitates a corresponding duality of instructions to subjects in shape 
perception research. Distally focused instructions should clearly indicate that 
shapes perceived as equal should be objectively equal, for example, being 
exactly physically superimposable. In contrast, proximally focused 
instructions should stress the projective equality of the to-be-matched shapes. 
However, as in size perception research, authors of shape perception studies 
sometimes use 'apparent' or 'look' instructions that don't clearly identify the 
matching criterion. As Sedgwick (1986) remarks, the results of such studies, 
in which matching shapes tend to be intermediate between distal and 
proximal shapes, are 'not very informative', much for the same reasons as in 
size perception studies. Results of experiments by Joynson & Newson (1962) 
and Lichte & Borresen (1967) indicate that some subjects interpret such 
instructions as referring to distal shape, and others as referring to proximal 
shape.   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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Conditions of presentation. Reduced-cue conditions in shape perception 
studies are similar to those used in size perception studies, with shapes 
usually presented as luminous outlines in complete darkness. In contrast, full-
cue conditions approach everyday observation conditions. 
Basic experimental results. Under  reduced-cue  conditions, proximal 
vision generally obtains, that is, the matching comparison shapes have 
proximal shapes close to the proximal shape of the standard (Thouless, 
1931a,b; Epstein, Bontrager & Park, 1962; Campione, 1977), even with distal 
instructions (Beck & Gibson, 1955; Nelson & Bartley, 1956). Thus the zero-
slant circle in cell A and the slanted ellipse in cell D would be perceived to 
have equal shapes. 
With full-cue conditions, given distally focused instructions, perception 
is generally more in accord with the distal state of affairs. Thus given the 
slanted circle in cell C as the standard, subjects would, ideally, match it with 
the upright circle in cell A. Similar to size constancy, this shape constancy 
tends not to be perfect, with some studies showing a degree of 
'underconstancy', and other showing 'overconstancy' (Lichte & Borresen, 
1967; Landauer, 1969). In contrast, with proximally focused instructions, the 
resulting matching shapes approach the proximal shape of the standard. 
However, such matches are generally not proximally veridical: the proximal 
shape of the matching comparison stimulus shape is usually larger than the 
proximal shape of the standard (Epstein, Bontrager & Park, 1962; Lichte & 
Borresen, 1967). As in size perception studies, deviations from criterion 
values may be due to insufficiently clear instructions, special subject 
strategies, or genuine perceptual causes. 
Perception of the confound variable. The third phenomenal variable of 
relevance in shape constancy studies, corresponding to the confound variable, 
is perceived slant. This attribute has generally been studied in its dependence 
on surface texture (see Sedgewick, 1986). This research will not be 
considered here. However, some aspects of correlations of perception of slant 
and shape will be noted below. 
Relations between variables. It is a fact of mathematics that there exists 
a relation between distal shapes, slants, and corresponding proximal shapes. 
For example, a circle slanted at an angle of 60
 o projects into an ellipse whose 
minor axis is half the size of its major axis. It would be a fact of perception, 
however, if analogous relations would prove to hold between phenomenal 
counterparts of these external variables. Such a proposal is expressed by the 
shape-slant invariance hypothesis (Koffka, 1935; Beck & Gibson, 1955), an 
analogue of the size-distance invariance hypothesis in size perception studies. 
This hypothesis claims that a given proximal shape constrains the relation of 
the corresponding perceived distal shape and perceived slant. Such a relation Dejan Todorović   
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should hold regardless of the veridicality of the percept. For example, if the 
proximal shape of a figure is elliptical, then, if the slant of that figure is 
perceived to be zero, its perceived distal shape should be elliptical, whereas if 
the perceived distal shape is circular, then the figure should be perceived to 
have a corresponding slant. A related hypothesis (analogous to McCready's 
formulation of the size-distance invariance hypothesis), holds that it is not the 
proximal shape but the perceived proximal shape that constrains the 
relationship of perceived distal shape and perceived slant (Eriksson, 
1967a,b). 
Empirical research has yielded equivocal support for the shape-slant 
invariance hypothesis (see Epstein & Park, 1963; Sedgwick, 1986). However, 
some data clearly indicate this type of relationship between phenomenal 
variables. An example is provided by the well-known Ames' window, a figure 
of trapezoidal shape (Ittelson, 1952). When viewed binocularly from a short 
distance, its shape and slant are perceived veridically. However, when 
presented in somewhat reduced-cue conditions (monocular view, relatively 
large viewing distance), perpendicularly to the view axis, it is perceived as a 
rectangularly shaped figure slanted in depth, a figure whose proximal shape 
would also be trapezoidal. A converse example is the perception of the back 
wall of Ames' room. Its proximal shape is rectangular, but it is in fact a 
trapezoidally shaped surface slanted in depth. However, it is perceived as a 
rectangular surface in fronto-parallel orientation. A study by Kaiser (1967) 
has also generally confirmed the coupling of perceived shape and perceived 
slant. 
 
(b) Shape illusions 
 
Shape illusions are cases in which lines and figures of equal distal shape 
and equal proximal shape have different phenomenal shape, or vice versa, 
when lines and figures of different distal shape and different proximal shape, 
have equal phenomenal shape. All shapes are presented at equal slants, so 
that this potential confound variable is held constant. One example is 
presented in Figure 16, using the context - no context paradigm. Because the 
effect is relatively small, two objects are used in order to enhance it visually. 
Cell A contains two line segments of rectilinear shape. Cell B contains two 
segments that are slightly curved and bowed towards each other. Cell C 
contains the same two rectilinear segments as in cell A, but they are overlaid 
with a star-like pattern of thicker lines. The same pattern overlays the 
curvilinear segments in cell D. 
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Note that the two segments in cell C, although objectively rectilinear, 
appear somewhat curved and bowed away from each other. This effect is 
known as the 'Hering illusion'. In contrast, the two curvilinear segments in 
cell D appear approximately rectilinear, or at least more rectilinear than the 
segments in cell C. In cell D the effect of objective curvilinearity is opposed 
by the inversely directed effect of induced curvilinearity. Thus the figures of 
different external (distal and proximal) shape in cells A and D have similar 
perceived shape, whereas the figures of equal external shape in cells A and C 
have different perceived shape. A measure of the induced effect can be 
provided by the extent of objective curvilinearity that is needed to make the 
curves appear rectilinear. Related shape illusions were reported by Wundt 
(1898), Ehrenstein (1925), and Orbison (1939). 
 
B. Perception of position - extrinsic geometric attributes 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the extrinsic geometric attributes are 
location,  decomposable into direction and distance, and orientation, 
decomposable into slant and tilt. There is an important difference between 
intrinsic and extrinsic geometric attributes. Size and shape, the intrinsic 
attributes, are independent from particular reference frames, in the sense that 
they can be defined independently from reference frames and that they 
remain the same in different reference frames. Locations and orientations of Dejan Todorović   
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objects are reference frame dependent, because they must be defined with 
respect to some reference frame, and the same object may have different 
values of these attributes in different reference frames. The reference frames 
may appear in the form of reference points, lines, planes, other objects, or 
complete 3-D co-ordinate systems. 
Reviews of location and orientation constancies and illusions can be 
found in Rock (1975), Shebilske (1977), Howard (1986), and Matin (1986). 
 
1. Perception of location 
 
Three kinds of location can be distinguished, distal, proximal, and 
phenomenal. These three kinds will be described in more detail in the following. 
Furthermore, different types of reference frames will be discussed. As noted 
before, reference frames for locations can be egocentric (perceiver-relative), or 
exocentric (environment-relative). Egocentric reference frames are based on 
some aspect of the body of the perceiver, whereas exocentric reference frames 
involve some aspect of the environment. In both cases there are several possible 
choices for reference frames. Some of these choices will be presented in the 
following. 
Distal locations. One variant of an egocentric reference frame for distal 
locations can be constructed in the following way. Consider the mid-frontal 
plane of the head: this is the plane that divides the head into a front and back 
half; any plane parallel to that plane is a fronto-parallel plane. Furthermore, 
consider a line that is perpendicular to that plane. Such a line can be used to 
define the straight-ahead direction as a reference direction. There are several 
spatial positions that such a line may assume. For example, the line may be 
defined to pass through a point midway between the two eyes, or through the tip 
of the nose. The position that will be assumed in the following is for the line to 
pass through one of the eyes, because I will only treat monocular perception. 
More precisely, the reference line will be assumed to pass through the center of 
eye rotation: this is the imaginary point about which the eye is rotated in its 
socket. This point does not coincide with the nodal point of the eye; however, 
the difference between the two points is negligible for the purpose of the present 
discussion, and will disregarded. 
All points which lie on the reference line in front of the subject, lie in the 
egocentric straight ahead direction. The egocentric directions of all other 
external points are defined by the lines connecting these points and the nodal 
point of the eye of the observer. These directions in 3-D can be defined with two 
angles, but I will not elaborate the appropriate geometrical constructions here; 
this is because in the examples I will, for simplicity, only use 2-D cross-sections   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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through 3-D space, and in such cases only one angle suffices to define the 
direction of any point, as will be shown below. 
Note that the straight ahead direction and all other egocentric directions, as 
defined here, do not depend on eye motions: when the head is motionless, its 
mid-frontal plane and the reference line perpendicular to it remain in the same 
position, regardless of how the eyes may move with respect to the head. 
One important aspect of the geometrical analysis is the orientation of the 
head with respect to gravity. When the head is vertical, that is, when its long 
axis is aligned with the direction of gravity, then the straight ahead direction is 
horizontal, that is, perpendicular to gravity. When the orientation of the head is 
not aligned with gravity, there are two possibilities. One possibility is that the 
head is rotated about some axis parallel to the straight ahead line. Such a 
possibility arises when the head is tilted toward one of the shoulders. In this case 
the straight ahead line is still horizontal. This possibility will be discussed in the 
section dealing with perception of orientation. In all the remaining cases the 
mid-frontal plane and the reference line change their spatial orientation, and thus 
the direction of straight ahead, as defined above, changes as well. Such cases 
will not be discussed here. 
Let us return to the case when the head is vertical, which will be assumed 
further on. A geographically vertical plane through the horizontal straight ahead 
line divides the visual field of the subject into a right half and a left half. A 
geographically horizontal plane through the straight ahead line divides the visual 
field into a top half and a bottom half. Note that 'straight ahead' is sometimes 
defined as comprising all points of the vertical plane lying in front of the subject. 
Defined in that way, 'straight ahead' does not name a single direction but a 
family of directions. An analogous concept, 'eye level', denotes a family of 
directions of points lying in the horizontal plane described above. The vertical 
plane, the horizontal plane, and a fronto-parallel plane through the nodal point 
define a Cartesian co-ordinate system centered in the nodal point. 
Note that other types of egocentric reference frames can also be defined. 
For example, a reference frame can be associated with the median or mid-
sagittal plane of the body, a plane that divides the body into a right half and left 
half. This reference frame stays constant when only the head turns or tilts, but 
the rest of the body does not move. 
The preceding discussion has dealt with examples of egocentric reference 
frames for distal locations. An example of an exocentric reference frame is the 
meeting place of any three walls in a room. Any location in the room can be 
defined with respect to a co-ordinate system with three walls as co-ordinate 
planes. Note that when an observer moves about in the room, the locations of 
points in the room with respect to the egocentric reference frames discussed 
above generally change. For example, what is located straight ahead of me at Dejan Todorović   
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one instant may be located toward my left at the next instant, etc. However, the 
locations with respect to the exocentric reference frame remain, of course, the 
same. 
Proximal locations. The second kind of location relevant for vision is 
proximal location, which is the location of a projected point on the retina. A 
reference frame associated with the retina can be defined in the following way. 
First, suppose that the head is vertical. Second, suppose that the eyes are in the, 
so called, primary position: this is the position in which the visual axis (the 
direction of gaze) is aligned with the straight ahead direction. In other words, the 
observer looks straight ahead. Then, the geographically vertical plane through 
the straight ahead line (or, equivalently, through the visual axis) defines a 
meridian on the retina that divides it into a left half and a right half, and the 
geographically horizontal plane defines a meridian that divides the retina into a 
top half and a bottom half. The two meridians, intersecting in the fovea, define a 
curvilinear co-ordinate system on the retina. They are sometimes referred to as 
the 'horizontal' and the 'vertical' meridian. However, these names are appropriate 
only when the eye is in the primary position; in other cases these meridians 
generally cease to lie in the vertical or horizontal plane. Taking into account the 
elliptical shape of the visual field, I will refer to the 'horizontal' meridian as the 
'major-axis' meridian, and to the 'vertical' meridian as the 'minor-axis' meridian. 
The location of any point on the retina can be specified by its distances from the 
two meridians, measured in angular terms; another possibility is to specify 
location by the distance from the fovea and the angle that the line connecting the 
point and the fovea subtends with one of the meridians. In 1-D cross-sections 
through the retina, such as in Figure 3, which will be used in the following, only 
a single signed number suffices to specify the location of a retinal point, and that 
is the angular distance of the point from the fovea. 
Phenomenal locations. The third relevant kind of location is phenomenal or 
perceived location, which refers to the conscious impression of locations of 
points. Perceived distal and perceived proximal location will be distinguished. 
Perception of distance will not be considered here, and only the directional 
aspect of perceived location will be analyzed. Furthermore, only egocentric 
location will be discussed, since the perception of purely exocentrically defined 
location has attracted little interest in the context of studies of constancies. 
 
(a) Direction constancy 
 
Target, proximal, and confound variable. The relations of three relevant 
variables are represented in row 3 in Figure 8. The graphical sketch depicts a 
2-D cross-section, as in Figure 3. The situation involves a distal object, 
depicted with an 'x', a retina, and several relevant directions. It is assumed   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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that the head is vertical, and thus that the straight ahead direction is 
horizontal, but that the eyes are not in the primary position. The target 
variable is egocentric object direction, indicated by the thick arrowed line. It 
is specified by the angle, D, that the line subtends with the reference, 
straight-ahead line, which is depicted by the dotted line in the figure. The 
corresponding proximal variable is the proximal location of the object, 
specified by the angular distance, α, of the projection point from the fovea 
(depicted by a small gray disk). The angle α depends not only on object 
direction but also on a confound variable, the gaze direction, indicated by a 
thin full line, extending perpendicularly from the fovea. Gaze direction is 
specified by the angle, g, that this line subtends with the straight-ahead line. 
Given a fixed distal object and fixed head position, when the gaze direction 
changes, the location of the projection of the external point changes as well. 
The relation between the three angular variables is given by the simple 
equation α = D - g. For example, if a distal object is located D = 30
o away 
from straight ahead, and the gaze deviates g = 20
o from straight ahead in the 
same direction, then the projection of the object is located at α = 10
o from the 
fovea. 
The 2x2 scheme. The effect of the distal and the confound variable on 
the proximal variable is further elaborated in Figure 17. Cell A depicts the 
simple situation in which all three directions (the direction of the object, the 
direction of the gaze, and the reference straight ahead direction) coincide, and 
all three angles are zero; the lines are drawn as slightly offset vertically. The 
object is located at the straight-ahead line, and the perceiver looks straight 
ahead, so that the object projects onto the fovea. The inset in the bottom right 
corner of cell A depicts the mutual spatial relation, on the retina, of the fovea 
and the retinal projection of the object; in this case, the two loci coincide. In 
cell B the object is located higher, but gaze direction is still straight ahead, so 
that, as shown in the inset, the object projects below the fovea. In cell C, the 
object direction is straight ahead, as in cell A, but the gaze is turned upwards, 
so that the object is projected above the fovea. In cell D, the gaze direction is 
equal to the object direction, and both deviate from straight ahead; the object 
projects into the fovea, as in cell A. 
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Comparison of row cells illustrates how the proximal location of the 
object depends on the target variable, the egocentric direction. Comparison of 
column cells shows how proximal location depends on gaze direction, the 
confound variable. Comparison of cells A and D shows how objects of 
different distal directions may have equal proximal locations, a fact inverse to 
the fact that objects of equal distal direction may have different proximal 
locations. 
Perceptual effects of the confound variable. The previous discussion 
concerning the effect of gaze direction was purely geometrical. The crucial 
perceptual question, however, is how gaze direction affects perceived 
direction. There are two basic possibilities. The first possibility is that the 
perceiver looks straight ahead, that is, that the gaze direction coincides with 
the straight ahead direction, as in cells A and B. Then the egocentric direction 
of any object with respect to straight ahead is the same as with respect to the 
gaze direction. Furthermore, the distal egocentric direction of an object is in 
accord with the proximal location of its projection, in the sense that the 
direction with respect to straight ahead agrees with the location with respect to 
the fovea. In this case the projected location of an object specifies its 
egocentric direction and vice versa. 
The second possibility is that gaze direction deviates from straight ahead. 
In this case a basic dilemma arises: are the perceived directions in accord with 
distal directions or with proximal locations? Again, the answer depends on the 
meaning of 'perceived direction'.   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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Two types of phenomenal variables. Two meanings of 'perceived (or 
phenomenal) egocentric direction' can be defined. The first meaning, which 
corresponds to the target variable, egocentric object direction D, will be 
referred to as 'perceived distal egocentric direction', and denoted as D'. This 
concept involves the conscious impression of the direction of external objects 
with respect to the head and the straight ahead direction. This meaning is 
exemplified in phrases such as 'object A lies directly straight ahead of me, 
object L is off to my left, and object R is off to my right'. Note that perceived 
distal egocentric direction, as defined here, does not depend on the direction of 
the gaze, provided that the head is fixed. However, it does  depend on the 
position of the head. In the above example, if the head is turned toward object 
L, then that object comes to lie straight ahead, and object A comes to lie 
toward right. 
The second sense of 'perceived egocentric direction' corresponds to the 
proximal variable α, the location of the projection of the external object on the 
retina. This notion will be referred to here as 'perceived proximal egocentric 
direction' and denoted as α '. Rock (1975) expresses the second sense of 
perceived egocentric direction by the terms 'perceived location in the visual 
field' and 'field location'. This notion refers to the conscious impression of the 
direction of an object within the momentary field of view and with respect to 
the current gaze direction. For example, when I look at object A from the 
previous example, its proximal location is at my fovea, and its perceived 
proximal direction is in my current gaze direction at the center of my current 
view. The proximal locations of other objects, such as L or R, are away from 
the fovea, and the corresponding perceived proximal directions are toward the 
periphery of my current field of view and away from my current gaze 
direction. When I switch my gaze from A to L then, provided that my head 
remains fixed, the perceived distal egocentric directions of these objects do 
not change: object A remains straight ahead and object L remains off to my 
left. However, the perceived proximal egocentric directions of these objects do 
change: object L is now at the center of my view, whereas object A lies toward 
the periphery. 
Note that it is not distal locations but proximal locations that guide 
oculomotor behavior. In the preceding example, the distal egocentric direction 
of object A remains straight ahead regardless of eye motions. However, in 
order to move my gaze to the direction of point A, if my gaze is currently 
directed at point L, I must move the gaze toward the proximal direction of 
object A, that is, toward right, whereas if my gaze is currently directed at 
point R, I have to move it toward left. 
Conditions of  presentation and basic experimental results. Only 
perceived distal direction will be discussed here because, although perceived 
proximal location is occasionally discussed as a valid, though intuitively Dejan Todorović   
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difficult to grasp concept (Rock, 1975), it has apparently escaped experimental 
interest of researchers of direction constancy. 
Our everyday experience tells us that with full-cue conditions, when we 
change the direction of gaze the perceived directions of objects with respect to 
us appear to stay the same. Thus the object in cell C would be perceived to lie 
in the same egocentric direction as the object in cell A, although its retinal 
projection is different due to the shift of gaze. Conversely, although the object 
in cell D projects into the same retinal locus as the object in cell A, it would 
not be perceived to lie in the same egocentric direction. In other words, 
egocentric direction constancy obtains. Such an outcome under full-cue 
conditions may in part be due to the fact that the relative spatial relationships 
of projections of external objects are unaffected by eye movements. 
Studies of perception of direction under reduced-cue conditions take 
different forms. Some investigations test directional accuracy. For example, 
studies of 'visually perceived straight ahead' generally use completely dark 
conditions with a single movable luminous point. The task of the subject is to 
vary the lateral position of the point until it is perceived to lie straight ahead. 
On the other hand, studies of 'visually perceived eye level' ask the subject to 
vary the vertical position of a luminous point (or, alternately, to vary the 
height of the chair they are sitting on, with the luminous point staying in a 
fixed position), until the perceived position of the point is at the level of their 
eye height. Note that such experimental setups do not involve the visual 
presentation of a standard stimulus; instead, the standard is set as a verbally 
described visual norm. 
While perceived straight ahead is generally accurate, that is, there is no 
consistent bias toward left or right, perceived eye height is somewhat 
inaccurate: the point that is perceived to lie at eye height in fact generally lies 
a few degrees below eye height; consequently, a point that is positioned at true 
eye height is perceived to lie above it. This is true for both reduced-cue and 
full-cue conditions, but the latter settings are somewhat more accurate (Stoper 
& Cohen, 1986). 
In the studies of directional accuracy the gaze direction coincides with 
the direction of the object whose positioned is judged; furthermore, since the 
head is held erect, the gaze direction is approximately horizontal. In genuine 
constancy studies these directions are dissociated. Such experiments under 
reduced-cue conditions involve only one or two luminous points at the same 
time, which serve as standard, variable, and gaze fixation stimuli. In some 
experiments, first the standard stimulus, at which the gaze is to be directed, is 
presented and extinguished; then, in a different visual direction a new gaze 
fixation point is presented, followed by a variable stimulus. The task of the 
subject is to match or compare the egocentric direction of the variable stimulus 
with the remembered egocentric direction of the standard, while maintaining   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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the gaze at the new fixation point. In other experiments, the direction of the 
standard is described verbally but is not presented visually: with the gaze 
directed on a laterally displaced fixation point, the subject is told to set the 
variable stimulus such that it lies 'straight ahead'. The first type of experiment 
uses the 'matching-to-standard' procedure, whereas the second is an example 
of 'matching-to-norm' procedures. 
Some studies find that, on average, egocentric direction constancy under 
reduced-cue conditions is relatively exact (Matin, 1986). Others find some 
underconstancy: the perceived straight ahead is somewhat displaced from the 
objective straight ahead towards  the direction of the fixation point. For 
example, if the gaze is fixed at a point that lies 30
o to the right of the straight 
ahead direction, then the variable stimulus that the subjects set as being 
located straight ahead is in fact located a few degrees towards right; this 
means that an object that is objectively straight ahead is perceived  to be 
somewhat to the left of straight ahead (Hill, 1972; Morgan, 1978). 
Perception of the confound variable. The foregoing sections have 
involved the phenomenal counterparts of egocentric distal direction (the target 
variable) and proximal location (the proximal variable). The third ingredient in 
direction constancy studies, objective gaze direction, g, which refers to the 
actual posture of the eye, also has a phenomenal counterpart, which will be 
called here 'perceived gaze direction', and denoted as g'. This notion refers to 
the felt position of the eye. Traditionally, discussions concerning gaze 
direction have mainly involved the problem of the organismic source of the 
information about gaze direction. It is generally believed that this information 
mainly stems from 'outflow', that is, the neural command to move the eyes, 
although 'inflow', the feedback information from eye muscles, may also play a 
role (Matin, 1986). 
Relations between variables. As noted before, the relation between the 
non-phenomenal variables takes the form α = D - g. Based on this relation, the 
cancellation theory of direction constancy (see Matin, 1986), holds that 
constant perceived direction of objects (D'  ), in the presence of eye 
movements, derives from the comparison and cancellation of neural 
representations of retinal displacement information (α) and eye position 
information (g). 
Such a relation may also be the basis of some departures from direction 
constancy. For example, if, for a given retinal location of a stimulus, the 
information about eye position is inaccurate, then perceived direction should 
also be inaccurate. This idea is consistent with some data concerning after-
effects of prolonged holding of the eyes in an eccentric position: when the 
eyes are relaxed again, the perceived straight ahead deviates for some time 
from the objective straight ahead toward the direction in which the eyes were 
held previously. This effect can be explained by the assumption that in this Dejan Todorović   
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situation the eye muscles, for a while, reflexively tend to return (to some 
extent) to their previous posture, but that this tendency is not registered 
properly in the rest of the visual system. Thus the eyes may actually be turned 
somewhat to the side, say toward right, but with the observer feeling that they 
are in the primary position, that is, oriented straight ahead. Then a point whose 
image falls onto the fovea, which is in fact located toward right, will be 
perceived to lie straight ahead (Paap & Ebenholtz, 1976). 
 
(b) Direction illusions 
 
Illusions of perceived direction arise when objects of equal egocentric 
directions and equal proximal location have different perceived directions, or 
vice versa. Such an example is described in Figure 18. It involves reduced-cue 
conditions in which only a luminous point and a rectangular frame are visible. 
The example on the printed page is only an illustration, since it does not 
satisfy these conditions and thus the relevant effect is not actually detectable. 
Cell A depicts a display which contains a luminous point located at the 
straight-ahead line, surrounded by a rectangular frame whose center coincides 
with the point. The two dotted lines depict the geographic horizontal and 
vertical bisectors of the visual field, dividing it into a top and bottom half, and 
a left and right half. In cell B the point is dislocated to the right, and thus does 
not lie straight ahead. In cell C the point lies straight ahead, but the position of 
the rectangle is shifted to the right. In cell D both the point and the rectangle 
are shifted, but not to the same amount. 
The direction illusion concerns the displays in which the position of the 
rectangle is eccentric. In such a case, if the point is located at the straight 
ahead line (as in cell C), it does not look  straight ahead: instead it looks 
displaced to the left of perceived straight ahead. This is an instance of the 
Roelofs effect (Roelofs, 1935; Werner, Wapner, & Bruell, 1953; Bruell & 
Albee, 1955; Bridgeman, 1993). Consequently, the point that is perceived to 
lie straight ahead is a point whose egocentric direction is shifted to the right of 
objective straight ahead (as in cell D). Thus the perceived direction of straight 
ahead is shifted in the same direction in which the rectangle is shifted, though 
not to the same amount. The amount of shift is a measure of the strength of the 
effect. 
Related illusions arise when subjects look into a box that is slanted 
upwards or downwards, or are placed, with head erect, into a similarly slanted 
room. In such cases the direction of visually perceived eye level is shifted 
vertically towards the direction of the slant of the box or the room (Li & 
Matin, 1995; Cohen, Ebenholtz & Linder, 1995; Welch & Post, 1996). 
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2. Perception of orientation 
 
Three types of orientation will be considered, distal, proximal, and 
phenomenal. As noted before, distal orientation is decomposable into tilt as 
slant. However, most studies of relevance for the discussion in this section have 
only used lines of zero slant, so that in the following orientation refers only to 
tilt. 
Like distal location, distal orientation may be defined with respect to an 
egocentric or an exocentric reference frame. The standard exocentric reference 
frame is the direction of gravity, which defines the geographic vertical 
orientation. This orientation may be visually defined, for example, by the 
orientation of trees, walls, or the paths of falling bodies. All other orientations 
can be defined by the angle they subtend with respect to the reference 
orientation; for example, the geographic horizontal orientation is defined as 
perpendicular to the vertical orientation. Egocentric reference frames that can be 
used are the orientations of longitudinal head or body axes. 
Proximal orientation refers to the orientation of projected figures on the 
retina. This orientation can be defined with respect to the retinal reference frame 
discussed in the section on proximal location, and can be specified by the angle 
that the projected line subtends with the major axis or minor axis meridian. I will 
disregard the fact that the retina is a curved surface and that retinal projections of 
rectilinear segments are in fact curvilinear in 3-D space. Dejan Todorović   
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Phenomenal orientation refers to the conscious impression of orientation. 
Perceived distal and perceived proximal variants of phenomenal orientation may 
be distinguished. Only perceived exocentric orientation will be discussed here, 
because few studies have dealt with pure egocentric orientation (but see Rock, 
1975; Goodenough, Nowak, Oltman, Cox, & Sigman, 1982). In the following 
analyses, it will be assumed that the eyes are in the primary position. 
 
(a) Orientation constancy 
 
Target, proximal, and confound variable. Three basic variables relevant for 
perception of orientation in the sense of tilt, with respect to the exocentric 
gravitational reference frame, are listed in row 4 of Figure 8. The accompanying 
figure depicts the retinal surface as an ellipse. A thick line is depicted as a 
projection of a distal line on the retina. The reference  orientation is the 
geographic horizontal, depicted as a dotted line. The target variable is distal 
orientation, defined here by the angle, O, that the distal line subtends with the 
geographic horizontal; this angle is the same as the angle that the projected line 
subtends with the geographic horizontal, as depicted in the figure. The proximal 
variable is proximal or retinal orientation, defined here by the angle, α, that the 
projection of the line subtends with the major axis retinal meridian, depicted as a 
full line. The retinal orientation α depends not only on object orientation O, but 
also on a confound variable, eye orientation, defined here by the angle, e, 
subtended by the major axis meridian and the geographic horizontal. The 
orientation of the eye deviates from the geographic horizontal when the head or 
the whole body is tilted. However, the eye tilt tends to be smaller than the 
corresponding head or body tilt, because of the effect of cyclotorsion, that is, a 
reflex counter rolling of the eyes in the direction opposite to tilt. As in the case 
of direction, the relation between the three relevant variables is very simple, and 
is given by α = O - e. For example, if a distal line is tilted by O = 30
o with 
respect to the geographic horizontal, and the eye is tilted by e = 20
o with respect 
to the same reference orientation, then the projected line is tilted by α = 10
o with 
respect to the major-axis retinal meridian. 
The 2x2 scheme. The effect of distal orientation and eye orientation on 
proximal orientation is elaborated in Figure 19, in a manner similar to the 
analysis of direction. Cell A depicts a case in which the orientation of the distal 
stimulus line, the retinal orientation of its projection, and the orientation of the 
eye all coincide with the geographic horizontal (the lines are drawn as vertically 
offset); thus all three angular variables are zero. In cell B the eye has the same 
orientation but the object is tilted with respect to geographic horizontal, and thus 
the projected line is tilted with respect to the retinal major axis meridian. In 
contrast, in cell C it is the eye which is tilted whereas the stimulus line is 
horizontal; consequently, the projected line is tilted with respect to the retinal   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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major axis meridian, but in the opposite direction than in cell B. In cell D both 
the stimulus object and the eye are tilted by the same amount in the same 
direction, so that the projected line is parallel to the retinal major axis meridian, 
as in cell A. 
Comparison of row cells illustrates the effect of object orientation on 
proximal orientation. Comparison of column cells illustrates the effect of eye 
orientation on proximal orientation. Comparison of cells A and D shows how 
different combinations of object orientation and eye orientation can result in 
equal proximal orientations. Thus objects of equal distal orientation may have 
different proximal orientations, and vice versa. 
Perceptual effects of the confound variable. The previous considerations 
were purely geometrical. The crucial perceptual issue concerns perceived object 
orientation. There are two basic possibilities. One possibility obtains when the 
head is erect. Then the orientations of the major-axis and minor-axis retinal 
meridians coincide with the geographic horizontal and vertical. In this case distal 
orientation agrees with proximal orientation, in the sense that the distal tilt of a 
line, with respect to the exocentric reference frame, is the same as the tilt of the 
projection of the line with respect to the retinal reference frame. The other 
possibility is that the head is tilted; this means that the eyes will also be tilted, 
though to a somewhat smaller (up to 10%) extent than the head, because of the 
effect of cyclotorsion. The problem that arises in this condition is whether 
perceived orientation is more in accord with distal orientation or with proximal 
orientation. As in previous cases, the phenomenal variable does not have a 
unique meaning. 
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Two types of phenomenal variables. The notion of 'perceived orientation' 
may be used in two senses. The first sense corresponds to distal orientation, O, 
and will be referred to as 'perceived distal orientation', denoted as O'. This 
notion involves the conscious impression of orientation with respect to some 
reference frame, for example gravity. The second sense is the phenomenal 
counterpart to proximal orientation, α. This notion will be referred to as 
'perceived proximal orientation', and denoted as α '; it could also be called 
'perceived visual field orientation'. Its meaning involves the impression of 
orientation with respect to the retina. This phenomenal variable appears not to 
have been studied experimentally. Reports of this variable could be elicited by 
proximally focused instructions to judge orientation of lines with respect to the 
eye rather than with respect to gravity.  
Conditions of presentation and basic experimental results. Our everyday 
visual experience informs us that, under full-cue  conditions, perceived 
orientations do not change when the head and thus also the eyes are tilted: 
perceived verticals stay vertical, perceived horizontals stay horizontal, etc. This 
is orientation constancy. Such an outcome may be based on the purely visual 
fact that the mutual geometric orientation relations of proximal objects (such as 
parallelness, perpendicularity, etc) are unaffected by eye tilt. 
Experiments under reduced-cue  conditions often involve only a single 
luminous line of variable tilt on a dark background. This line is the variable 
stimulus, and the standard stimulus is usually not given visually but is described 
in the form of a norm: the task of the subject is to set the line to a prescribed 
exocentric orientation, such as the geographical horizontal or vertical. 
Similar to the studies of direction, studies of orientation take different 
forms. Some studies test orientational accuracy. When the longitudinal head 
axis is vertical, the subjects are able to set a variable line within 1
o of the 
geographic horizontal and vertical (Witkin & Asch, 1948; Mann, Berthelot-
Berry, & Dauterive, 1949). In genuine constancy studies the head axis is tilted 
with respect to vertical. In such conditions the settings consistently deviate 
somewhat from the geographic norms (Miller, Fregly, van den Brink, & 
Graybiel, 1965). For smaller angles of tilt (<60
o), the settings are biased towards 
the direction of head tilt: for example, if the head is tilted counter-clockwise, 
then the line that is perceived as horizontal or vertical is objectively also tilted 
counter-clockwise, but to a much smaller amount than the head. Consequently, a 
line that is in fact geographically vertical or horizontal appears to be tilted in the 
clockwise direction. This bias does not vary linearly with head tilt: with 
increasing head tilt it first increases and then decreases. The maximum bias of 
perceived line tilt is obtained between 40
o and 50
o head tilt and amounts to less 
than 8
o. For larger angles of head tilt (>60
o), the results are reversed, that is, the 
settings are biased away from the direction of head tilt. In sum, under reduced-
cue conditions with vertical head orientation judgements of canonical   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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orientations (horizontal and vertical) are fairly accurate, whereas with the head 
tilted, there is some underconstancy for tilts less than 60
o, and some 
overconstancy for larger tilts. 
Perception of the confound variable and relations between variables. The 
phenomenal counterpart to e, the actual eye orientation is perceived eye 
orientation, e'. Judgements concerning this phenomenal variable could be based 
on vestibular, proprioceptive, or tactile information concerning head and body 
tilt. 
The relation among the non-phenomenal variables takes the form α = O - e. 
A cancellation theory of orientation constancy holds that the perception of 
orientation,  O', is based on the comparison and cancellation of neural 
representations of proximal orientation, α, and eye or head orientation, e.  
Such a relation may also underlie some departures from orientation 
constancy. If, for a given retinal orientation, the orientation of the eye or head is 
for some reason misperceived, this should be accompanied by a corresponding 
misperception of distal orientation. Such a correlation is indeed found in some 
studies of the 'rod-and-frame-illusion', which will be described in the next 
section. In this effect a line is presented together with a large tilted frame. In 
such conditions, the line that is perceived to be vertical is in fact tilted to some 
extent in the direction of the tilt of the frame; concomitantly, some subjects 
erroneously perceive that their body or head are tilted in the opposite direction 
(Ebenholtz & Benzschawel, 1977). 
 
(b) Orientation illusions 
 
Orientation illusions are cases of different perceived orientations of lines 
with equal distal (geographic) orientations and proximal (retinal) orientations, or 
vice versa. One example is presented in Figure 20. It is the orientational 
analogue of the Roelofs effect, and, like it, it cannot be adequately presented on 
the printed page. It involves a reduced-cue situation which contains only a line 
and a frame. The line is vertically oriented in the cells in the left column, and is 
tilted clockwise in the cells in the right column; the frame is vertically oriented 
in the cells in the top row, and tilted clockwise in the bottom row. The cases in 
the bottom row are of perceptual interest. In contrast to the line in cell A, the 
geographically vertical line in cell C does not appear vertical, but tilted counter-
clockwise. In order to be perceived as vertical in a frame that is tilted clockwise, 
the line must also be tilted clockwise, but to a smaller extent. This phenomenon 
is a variant of the 'rod-and-frame effect' (Witkin & Asch, 1948; Ebenholtz, 
1977). 
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Many examples of orientation illusions can be produced when one or 
more lines are intersected or surrounded by other lines with different 
orientations. Such effects are measurable with single lines, but are more 
noticeable with more complex displays. Such an example is presented in 
Figure 21. Cell A contains two parallel lines, whereas the two lines in cell B 
are not quite parallel, and converge somewhat towards top right. Cell C 
contains the same two parallel lines as in cell A, but crossed with sets of 
shorter lines; in consequence, the two lines appear to diverge slightly towards 
top right. This effect is an example of the Zöllner illusion. In cell D the same 
set of short lines are overlaid upon the two nonparallel lines from cell B. In 
consequence, these lines appear more or less parallel, similar to lines in cell 
A. The degree of divergence of these lines is a measure of the strength of the 
effect. 
   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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C. Perception of surface color - intrinsic photometric attributes 
 
As noted in the introduction, object surfaces are photometrically 
characterized by their distal color, that is, the spectral distribution of reflectance, 
which is the fraction of light reflected at different wavelengths of the spectrum. 
Distal color is an intrinsic attribute of a surface. It is not affected by changes of 
illumination of the surface, nor by the simultaneous presence of surfaces of other 
colors. However, as will be discussed in the following, such circumstances may 
affect the perception of color. Illumination, the extrinsic photometric attribute of 
surfaces, has rarely been studied in the framework of constancies and illusions, 
and will not be considered here from that aspect. Perception of achromatic and 
chromatic color will be discussed separately. 
Reviews of many aspects of achromatic color perception can be found in 
Rock (1975), and in a book edited by Gilchrist (1994). Reviews of chromatic 
color perception are provided by Hurvich (1981), Pokorny & Smith (1986) and 
Wyszecki (1986). 
 
1. Perception of achromatic color 
 
Three types of achromatic color will be discussed: distal, proximal, and 
phenomenal.  Distal achromatic color is a characteristic of surfaces whose Dejan Todorović   
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spectral distributions are approximately constant, that is, the proportion of 
illumination that is reflected back from such surfaces is approximately the same 
at all spectral wavelengths. Thus the distal color of an achromatic surface can be 
adequately expressed by a single number, its achromatic reflectance, denoted 
here as R. Reflectance is a non-dimensional number theoretically ranging from 0 
to 1. 
The proximal variable corresponding to distal achromatic color is proximal 
achromatic color or luminance, λ, which is the amount of light, per unit time, 
that is reflected from the surface and arrives at the retina. Luminance is a 
number whose theoretical range starts from zero and has no upper bound. It is 
expressed in appropriate light flux units.  
Phenomenal achromatic color comes in at least two varieties. One 
corresponds to distal achromatic color and the other to proximal achromatic 
color. 
 
(a) Achromatic color constancy 
 
There are two types of confound variables that can affect proximal 
achromatic color. They are illumination and slant. 
(i) Achromatic color constancy with respect to illumination.  Target, 
proximal, and confound variable. The three external variables that are involved 
in achromatic constancy studies are reflectance, luminance and illumination. 
They are listed in row 5 of Figure 8, together with a geometrical sketch and an 
analytic expression of their relation. The sketch involves an elongated gray 
rectangle, symbolizing a surface and its reflectance R, an arrow pointing at the 
surface, symbolizing the incoming illumination I, and an arrow pointing away 
from the surface, symbolizing its luminance λ; the latter arrow is thinner than the 
former, since luminance is a fraction  of illumination, the size of which is 
governed by R. In studies of achromatic color constancy the target variable is 
reflectance, and the corresponding proximal variable is luminance. Luminance, 
λ, depends not only on reflectance, R, but also on illumination, i, which is the 
confound variable. 
The relation between the three variables in its simplest form is expressed by 
the formula λ =R i. Thus luminance λ is directly proportional to illumination i, 
with reflectance R as the factor of proportionality. For example, a surface of 
reflectance R=0.5 illuminated by 100 light units, has a luminance of λ =50 light 
units. The formula presupposes that the surface is illuminated perpendicularly. 
Another presupposition is that the surface is lambertian, that is, that it reflects 
light uniformly in all directions. This is a fair approximation for matt surfaces 
but is only partially appropriate for glossy surfaces, as they also involve a 
dominant reflection direction. Such complications will not be dealt with here.   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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The 2x2 scheme. The effects of reflectance and illumination on luminance 
are further elaborated in Figure 22. Cell A depicts an initial situation with 
reflectance R1, illumination i1, and the resulting luminance λ A. Cell B depicts a 
surface with higher reflectance, R2, symbolized by a gray rectangle whose color 
is lighter than in cell A, under the same illumination as in cell A. Consequently, 
the luminance λB of the surface in cell B is larger than in cell A, a state of affairs 
symbolized by the thicker outgoing arrow. Cell C depicts a surface of the same 
reflectance as in cell A, but under weaker illumination, i2. Consequently, the 
luminance λC of the surface is smaller than in cell A. Finally, cell D depicts a 
surface of higher reflectance than in cell A but under lower illumination. The 
oppositely directed effects of reflectance and illumination are assumed to be 
mutually compensating, so that the luminance λD of the surface is the same as 
the luminance λA in cell A. 
 
 
 
Comparison of row cells illustrates the effect of reflectance on luminance, 
showing that surfaces of higher reflectance have higher luminance. Comparison 
of column cells illustrates the effect of illumination on luminance, showing that 
surfaces under higher illumination have higher luminance; thus surfaces with 
equal reflectances may have different luminances. Comparison of examples in 
cells A and D illustrates the inverse effect, that surfaces with different 
reflectances may have equal luminance.  
Perceptual effect of the confound variable. The preceding account was 
purely photometric and has involved only relations between external variables. Dejan Todorović   
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The basic perceptual issue, however, is the appearance or perceived color of 
achromatic surfaces of different reflectances under different illuminations. 
Consider first the case of two surfaces of equal reflectance under equal 
illumination, and thus with equal luminance. In case of the concordant vision 
mode such surfaces are also perceived to have the same achromatic color. 
However, as it will be illustrated in the section on achromatic color illusions, 
such surfaces do not necessarily look the same if their surrounds are different. 
The main issue to be discussed in this section is the appearance of surfaces 
under different illumination. Suppose that in a matching experiment the standard 
stimulus is the surface in cell A, with reflection R1 and illumination i1, and that 
the comparison stimuli are presented under a lower illumination, i2. In classical 
studies the decrease of illumination was often produced by a shadow or by 
moving the comparison stimuli further away from the light source (Katz, 1935). 
The question is whether subjects perform luminance matches or 
reflectance matches, in other words, whether the matching comparison stimulus 
is a surface of equal reflectance but different luminance, as in cell C, or a surface 
of equal luminance but different reflectance, as in cell D? The answer depends 
on presentation conditions and the attribute that the subjects are asked to match. 
Two types of phenomenal variables. The first type of phenomenal variable 
is 'perceived distal achromatic color', or 'perceived achromatic reflectance', 
denoted here as R'. It involves the conscious impression of the reflectance of a 
surface. In contrast to perceived geometric variables, this perceived photometric 
variable has a special single name, and is generally referred to as 'lightness'. In 
normal viewing conditions the perceived color of achromatic surfaces with 
reflectance less than about 0.05 is called black, and of those with reflectance 
more than about 0.80 it is called white, whereas the intermediate reflectances 
appear as various shades of gray. 
The second type of phenomenal achromatic color is 'perceived proximal 
achromatic color', or 'perceived achromatic luminance'. It is generally referred to 
as 'brightness', and is denoted here as λ'. Brightness refers to the conscious 
impression of luminance, that is, the amount of light arriving at the retina. It is 
often described as ranging from dim to bright. 
Other terms for lightness include 'quality', 'whiteness', and 'grayness', 
whereas brightness is sometimes also referred to as 'strength', 'weight', or 
'insistence' (see Lie, 1969). The phenomenology of perceived color is 
complicated by the existence of various 'modes' of color perception (Katz, 
1935). A special problem is raised by 'perceived luminosity', the fact that some 
surfaces are perceived as glowing, or emitting light (Wallach, 1976; Bonato & 
Gilchrist, 1994). Such percepts are induced not only by surfaces that actually 
emit light, but also by surfaces that reflect light, such as the moon in the night   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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sky. A classification of achromatic color percepts encompassing some of these 
distinctions is proposed by Heggelund (1992). 
Instructions to subjects in some studies of achromatic color perception may 
not have explicitly indicated which sense of perceived achromatic color the 
experimenters have in mind when they present to subjects a standard surface and 
ask them to find a surface of matching achromatic color. Explicit 'lightness' 
instructions are distally focused, that is, they would stress that it is the 
reflectances of the two surfaces that are to be matched, for example by asking 
that the two matching surfaces should look identical if put under equal 
illumination, or that they should turn out to be painted with the same shade of 
paint, or cut from the same piece of paper (Arend & Goldstein, 1987). In 
contrast, 'brightness' instructions are proximally focused and would stress that 
the judgement concerns the amount of light arriving at the retina from the two 
surfaces. 
Conditions of presentation. Similar to studies of geometric perception, 
studies of photometric perception are conducted under two basic types of 
viewing conditions. In classical studies, they are referred to as the reduction 
screen condition and the free-viewing condition. In the first case, which is an 
instance of the reduced-cue conditions, the two surfaces that are to be matched 
are observed through two openings in the reduction screen; this device is simply 
a homogeneous achromatic surface which covers most of the visual field of the 
observers, except for the two openings, which only allow the view of the two 
relevant surfaces and nothing else. Under free-viewing conditions, an instance of 
full-cue conditions, the observer has a full, unobstructed view of the 
experimental setup. In more recent studies these conditions are often simulated. 
No actual reflecting surfaces, reduction screens or sources of illumination are 
used: instead, all these components of the setup are simulated on a computer 
screen. 
Basic experimental results. Under reduced-cue conditions, the subjects 
perform a luminance match, that is, they declare as perceptually equal two 
surfaces with approximately equal luminances. Thus a surface in shadow that is 
matched with a directly illuminated surface has to have a higher reflectance, in 
order to compensate for the lower illumination it receives. 
With full-cue conditions, the outcome depends on instructions to subjects. 
With distally focused instructions, lightness constancy is generally obtained, that 
is, the matching stimulus is similar in reflectance to the standard stimulus, with 
some studies finding a degree of underconstancy. With proximally focused 
instructions, the matching stimulus tends to covary with the luminance of the 
standard stimulus; however the correspondence is generally not exact and the 
matching values tend to have large variability (Gelb, 1929; Katz, 1935; Arend & Dejan Todorović   
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Goldstein, 1987; Jacobsen & Gilchrist, 1988; Gilchrist, 1988; Arend & Spehar, 
1993 a,b). 
Perception of the confound variable. The third phenomenal variable 
relevant in lightness constancy studies (in addition to lightness and brightness) is 
'perceived achromatic illumination', denoted here as i'. Not many data are 
available on this variable (but see Beck, 1961, 1972; Kozaki & Noguchi, 1976; 
Gilchrist, Delman, & Jacobsen, 1983; Longvinenko & Menshikova, 1994). 
Relations between variables. One version of the so-called albedo 
hypothesis or lightness-illumination invariance hypothesis assumes  that, 
corresponding to the relation of external photometric achromatic variables, of 
the form λ = R i, there also holds an analogous relation between the three 
corresponding phenomenal variables, of the form λ' = R' i' (Longvinenko & 
Menshikova, 1994). Another version has the form λ = R' i', that is, it involves 
luminance and not brightness (Koffka, 1935; Beck, 1972). 
Some results do indicate a mutually compensating relationship between 
perceived illumination and lightness. For example, the Gelb effect (Gelb, 1929; 
Newson, 1958; Stewart, 1959; Gogel & Mershon, 1969; Noguchi & Kozaki, 
1985; Cataliotti & Gilchrist, 1995) involves a strongly illuminated black disk 
standing in front of a generally poorly illuminated background. If illumination 
conditions are arranged in such a way that no portion of the background that 
surrounds the disk is itself illuminated, then the lightness of the disk is perceived 
as white; furthermore, the disk is perceived as receiving the general illumination 
of the rest of the room. In contrast, if some illumination falls upon the immediate 
background of the disk, then its lightness is perceived as a shade of grey; 
furthermore, the disk and its immediate back-ground are perceived to stand 
under special illumination, different from the rest of the room. A similar percept 
can be induced by the introduction of a genuine white surface in front of the 
disk. Thus the same luminance is in one case associated with high perceived 
achromatic color and low perceived illumination, and in the other case with 
medium to low perceived achromatic color and high perceived illumination. 
Other examples of covariation of perceived achromatic color and perceived 
illumination were reported by Hering (1874/1964), Kozaki & Noguchi, 1976, 
Gilchrist, 1977, 1988, Gilchrist, Delman, & Jacobsen, 1983, and Longvinenko & 
Menshikova, 1994. 
(ii) Achromatic color constancy with respect to slant.  In all foregoing 
discussions it was implicitly assumed that the direction of illumination on the 
standard and variable stimuli is equal. This is an important assumption because 
the luminance of a surface depends not only on its reflectance and illumination, 
but also on the orientation of the surface with respect to the direction of 
illumination. This dependence is depicted in Figure 8, row 6, and is expressed by 
the relation λ = R i cos a, where a is the angle between the direction of   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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illumination and the normal to the surface. For example, a surface of reflectance 
R = 0.5, illuminated by light of i = 100 units and subtending an angle of a = 60E 
with respect to illumination direction, has luminance of λ = 25 units (since cos 
60
o = 0.5). For normal direction of illumination a = 0
 o, cos a = 1, and the 
equation reduces to the previous case, depicted in row 5. 
The 2x2 scheme. The effect of the illumination angle is further illustrated in 
Figure 23. The two top cells are the same as in Figure 22, where the angle is a=0
 
o . In the two bottom cells the surface is slanted with respect to illumination 
direction, the value of the cosine is less than 1, and the luminance is lower than 
for the corresponding cases in the two top cells. The luminance is the same in 
cells A and D because the effect of the inclination angle in cell D is assumed to 
be compensated by the higher reflectance of the surface.  
 
 
 
 
Perceptual effects of the confound variable. How does the perception of 
achromatic color depend on the slant of the illumination? Given the surface in 
cell A as standard, will subjects match it with the surface in cell C, which has 
equal reflectance but different luminance, or with the surface in cell D, with 
different reflectance but equal luminance? 
Basic experimental results and relations between variables. In our 
everyday perceptual activities the role of slant may be appreciated by examining 
the lightness of surfaces differently oriented with respect to the light source, Dejan Todorović   
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such as two adjoining walls. People generally perceive such surfaces as having 
the same achromatic color, but may note at the same time that one surface 
receives higher illumination than the other. Such a percept is an example of 
lightness constancy with respect to slant. However, when this setup is observed 
under reduction conditions, that is, through a hole that allows only the of view a 
part of the common edge of the two walls and portions of their adjoining 
regions, then the percept is different. One then sees two abutting fields of clearly 
different lightness; furthermore the two fields are misperceived to be coplanar 
(Rock, 1975; see also Gelb, 1932). Such results suggest a coupling of perceived 
slants and perceived achromatic colors, with the luminances held constant. 
Several studies have confirmed such a relationship (Hochberg & Beck, 1954; 
Beck, 1965; Flock & Freedberg, 1970), with especially strong effects reported 
by Gilchrist (1980). 
 
(b) Achromatic color illusions. 
 
Illusions of achromatic color involve surfaces with equal reflectance and 
luminance that are perceived to have different achromatic color, or surfaces with 
different reflectance and luminance that are perceived to have equal achromatic 
color. These displays involve reflecting surfaces lying in the same plane, viewed 
under equal illumination and equal illumination angle; thus these variables do 
not act as confounds. Note that in many studies such displays are simulated by 
various combinations of emissive surfaces, slanted surfaces, and several sources 
of illuminations; however, such setups generally give the impression of coplanar 
reflecting surfaces under equal illumination. 
The classical example of a lightness illusion is simultaneous lightness 
contrast (Hess & Pretori, 1894/1970; Wallach, 1948; Heinemann, 1972; 
Gilchrist 1988; Whittle, 1994a,b). It basically involves a patch of one luminance 
and reflectance surrounded by a patch of different luminance and reflectance. In 
Figure 24 the central square has one level of luminance in cells A and C in the 
left column, and a somewhat lower level of luminance in cells B and D in the 
right column. The surround has high luminance in cells A and B in the top row, 
and low luminance in cells C and D in the bottom row. 
The perceptual effect of interest here concerns the comparison of lightness 
of central patches. Comparison of row cells illustrates the effect of luminance on 
lightness. Comparison of column cells shows that patches of equal luminance 
and reflectance may appear differently light: the square in cell A, with a bright 
surround, appears darker than the square in cell C, with a dark surround; the 
same is true for cells B and D. Conversely, the squares in cells A and D have 
approximately the same lightness: the perceptual effects of the differences of 
their own interior luminance are approximately compensated by the effects of   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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the differences of their surrounds. The difference in luminance of central squares 
that appear equally light is a measure of the strength of the effect of the 
surround. 
 
 
 
Another lightness illusion is presented in Figure 25. Cell A contains two 
squares of equal luminance on a homogeneous background. Cell B also 
contains two squares on a homogeneous background, but the right-hand 
square is slightly less luminant. In cell C, the two squares of cell A are placed 
on a black-and-white background, whereas in cell D the same background is 
used for the two squares of cell B. 
The two squares in cell C do not appear equally light although they are 
equally luminant; instead, the right-hand square appears lighter. This 
phenomenon is an example of White's effect (White, 1979; White & White, 
1985; Kingdom & Moulden (1991); Špehar, Gilchrist & Arend, 1995). In 
contrast, the two differently luminant squares in cell D appear, if not exactly 
equally light, at least more similar in lightness than the equiluminant squares 
in cell C. Note an important structural difference between simultaneous 
contrast and White's effect: in simultaneous contrast one target square is 
completely surrounded by white and the other by black; in White's effect, 
both target squares border on both white and black surrounding regions, and 
the borders are of equal length. Dejan Todorović   
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The two illusions presented above were described as illusions of lightness. 
In most studies of achromatic color illusions the difference between lightness 
and brightness is not emphasized. However, there is no reason to expect a 
different structure of results with lightness and brightness instructions, because 
the displays are perceived as being under equal illumination. 
There are many other achromatic color illusions. They include the Mach 
bands (Mach, 1865; Ratliff, 1965), the Ehrenstein illusion (Ehrenstein, 1941; 
Spillmann, Fuld, & Gerrits, 1976), lightness assimilation (Helson, 1961), the 
Craik-O'Brien-Cornsweet effect (Cornsweet, 1970; Burr, 1987; Todorović, 
1987), the Hermann grid (Hermann, 1870; Spillmann, 1994), the Koffka-Benussi 
ring (Metzger, 1975), achromatic neon color (Bressan, 1993), and others (e.g. 
Spillmann & Levine, 1971; McCourt, 1982; Adelson, 1993; Todorović, 1997). 
 
2. Perception of chromatic color 
 
Distal, proximal, and phenomenal chromatic color will be considered. 
Distal chromatic color is the spectral distribution of reflectance of chromatic 
surfaces. In contrast to all discussed geometric attributes, as well as achromatic 
color, chromatic color is neither a scalar nor a vector variable but a functional 
variable, that is, it cannot, in principle, be specified with a single number or 
several numbers, but by an infinity of numbers, that is, a function. This function   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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is denoted here as R(w) and specifies, for each wavelength w, the fraction of 
light that the surface reflects at that wavelength. 
Proximal chromatic color is the spectral distribution of luminance, denoted 
here as λ (w). It specifies, for each wavelength, the amount of light that arrives at 
a retinal locus in unit time. 
The perceived or phenomenal colors of chromatic surfaces have a more 
complex structure than for achromatic surfaces. Three phenomenal attributes are 
usually distinguished, called hue, lightness, and saturation. In the following I 
will mainly consider the attribute of hue. Two variants of perceived chromatic 
color can in principle be distinguished, perceived distal and perceived proximal 
chromatic color. 
 
(a) Chromatic color constancy 
 
Target, proximal, and confound variable. Three functional variables and 
their relations are listed in row 7 of Figure 8, using simplified and somewhat 
artificial examples of spectral distributions. The mathematical relation between 
these three variable is the complete functional analogue of the corresponding 
achromatic case, and is given by λ(w) = R(w) i(w). Thus for any concrete value 
of wavelength w, the luminance at that wavelength is given as the product of 
surface reflectance at that wavelength and illumination at that wavelength. 
Therefore, as in the achromatic case, the proximal  variable, the luminance 
spectral distribution reflected from a surface, is affected not only by the distal 
variable, the reflectance spectral distribution of that surface, but also by a 
confound variable, the spectral distribution of the illumination. 
The way the above formula works in a simple case is also sketched in row 
7. It contains a graphical depiction of the effects of the three variables as well as 
the corresponding three functions. The independent, x-axis variable is in all 
three cases the wavelength w of light. The spectral distribution of illumination, 
i(w), is, for simplicity, assumed homogeneous, that is, it contains light of equal 
intensity at all wavelengths. The reflectance spectral distribution has the shape 
of an inverted-U function. Consequently, the luminance spectral distribution also 
has the same shape, because it results from the multiplication of the reflectance 
spectral distribution by a constant number. This situation very roughly 
corresponds to a greenish surface illuminated by daylight. 
The 2x2 scheme. The relations between the three variables are further 
discussed in Figure 26. Note that cell A depicts the same state of affairs as row 7 
in Figure 8. Cells A and C involve a surface with an inverted-U (parabolical) 
reflectance spectral distribution, whereas cells B and D involve a surface with a 
negatively sloped linear reflectance spectral distribution. On the other hand, cells 
A and B depict constant illumination at all wavelengths, whereas cells C and D Dejan Todorović   
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depict a positively sloped linear illumination spectral distribution. In all cells the 
luminance distribution is the product of the illumination distribution and the 
reflectance distribution. 
Note that the shapes of the luminance distributions in cells A and B are the 
same as the shapes of the reflectance distributions; this is because the 
illumination distribution is constant. In contrast, all three distributions in cells C 
and D have different shapes. Consider first cell C. Since the reflectance is zero at 
the endpoints of the distribution, the luminance must also be zero at those points. 
The reflectance distribution is symmetrical about its midpoint, but the 
illumination distribution is asymmetrical, so that the luminance distribution is 
also asymmetrical. The exact shape of the luminance distribution is given by the 
product of the linear function and the parabolic function. In cell D, the shape of 
the luminance distribution is given by the product of two linear functions of 
opposite slope, and is the same as in cell A. 
 
 
 
Perceptual effect of the confound variable. The preceding analysis is 
purely photometric. The crucial perceptual issue is the appearance of surfaces 
in question. Given the surface in cell A as standard, will it be matched with 
the surface in cell C, which has the same reflectance distribution but different 
luminance distribution, or the surface in cell D with a different reflectance 
distribution but same luminance distribution?   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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Two types of phenomenal variables. Similar to the achromatic case, two 
types of phenomenal chromatic colors may be distinguished. The first type 
can be called 'perceived distal chromatic color' or 'perceived chromatic 
reflectance'. It refers to the conscious impression of the color of object 
surfaces. The second type can be called 'perceived proximal chromatic color' 
or 'perceived chromatic luminance'. It refers to the conscious impression of 
the color of the light arriving at the retina from some spatial direction. This 
type of distal-proximal distinction has rarely been explicitly drawn in color 
research. Exceptions include Arend (1993, 1994), who has suggested terms 
'apparent surface color', on the one hand, and 'unasserted color' or 
'unattributed color' on the other, and Kuriki & Uchikawa (1996), who use the 
terms 'surface color' and 'apparent color' for a related distinction. The 
instructions that attempt to elicit matches reflecting the two types of 
phenomenal variables are similar to analogous instructions concerning 
achromatic color perception. 
Presentation conditions. Many chromatic color perception studies are 
conducted under very restricted-cue conditions, that is, both the standard and 
the comparison color field are presented as patches of light on dark, 
homogeneous achromatic backgrounds. Many other studies involve slightly 
more complex stimuli, involving both center and surround portions. There are 
also studies using more differentiated stimuli, consisting of random 
arrangements of rectangles ('mondrians'). More natural conditions, involving 
complexities such as 3-D layouts, multiple light sources, or shadows, are 
rarely used, because of problems of exact specifications of stimuli. 
Basic experimental results. With completely reduced-cue conditions, 
matches are performed in terms of luminance distributions. That is, two 
isolated fields of light are perceived to have equal chromatic color when the 
compositions of light arriving from them at the retina are equal. However, 
under laboratory conditions, isolated light fields of physically very different 
compositions may also have equal perceived chromatic color, provided that 
they have equal effects on the retinal cones; this is the phenomenon of 
metamerism, which will not be considered here. 
Two light fields of equal distal chromatic color under equal illumination 
may not have equal perceived chromatic color if their immediate surrounds 
are different. This is 'simultaneous color contrast', a chromatic color illusion 
phenomenon, which will be considered in the next section. 
Of main interest in the present section are conditions in which surfaces 
are viewed under different illumination. Everyday observations suggest that 
when a surface is viewed freely, as a part of a more articulated display, its 
perceived chromatic color in general tends to stay the same in spite of 
changes in the composition of illumination, say from daylight to artificial Dejan Todorović   
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light. Thus approximate chromatic color constancy obtains, that is, 
perceptual matches are made in terms of reflectance distributions. 
Experimental studies indicate that, in general, chromatic color constancy is a 
less stable and dependable phenomenon than achromatic color constancy. 
Furthermore, whereas constancy may hold very well for some particular 
combinations of surface colors and illumination colors, it may fail drastically 
for some other combinations (Katz, 1935; Wallach & Galloway, 1946; 
Helson, Judd, & Warren, 1952; Worthey, 1985; Arend & Reeves, 1986; 
Blackwell & Buchsbaum, 1988; Valberg & Lange-Malecki, 1990; Brainard & 
Wandell, 1992; Arend, 1993; Kuriki & Uchikawa, 1996). One problem is that 
the number of combinations of surface colors and illumination colors is huge, 
and that most experiments have sampled only a small portion of the possible 
stimulus space. 
In addition to perceived distal and proximal chromatic color, there is a 
third phenomenal variable of potential relevance in chromatic color studies. 
This variable is 'perceived chromatic illumination'. It corresponds to the 
conscious impression of the color of illumination. Everyday observations 
suggest that we are sometimes sensitive to the chromatic difference of 
daylight and various kinds of artificial lighting, for example when we 
experience them in close spatial arrangement or temporal succession. 
However, this variable has attracted little experimental interest. A chromatic 
analogue of the albedo hypothesis, which would suggest a coupling of 
perceived distal chromatic color and perceived chromatic illumination, with 
the luminance distribution held constant, appears also to have escaped 
attention. 
 
(b) Chromatic color illusions 
 
Illusions of perception of chromatic color arise when surfaces of equal 
distal and proximal chromatic color have different perceived color, or vice 
versa, with illumination held constant. The classical example of such an 
effect is simultaneous color contrast, one version of which is schematically 
illustrated in Figure 27. The stimuli involve a central region and a surround. 
Cell A depicts a situation with a central region that emits monochromatic 
light of 580 nm, and an achromatic surround. Cell B involves a central region 
with light of somewhat longer wavelength (600 nm) on the same surround as 
in cell A. Cells C and D involve the same center regions as cells A and B, 
respectively, but the surrounds here consist of monochromatic light of 700 
nm. 
   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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The perceptual effects concern the appearance of center regions. The 
phenomenal color generally corresponding to light of 580 nm viewed on an 
achromatic surround is yellow (cell A). Light of longer wavelength on the same 
surround is perceived as reddish yellow (cell B). When the same lights are 
viewed on different surrounds they look different. Viewed on a surround 
consisting of light of 700 nm, which is perceived as red, light of 580 nm appears 
as a somewhat greenish yellow (cell C). This shift towards green is also induced 
in the 600 nm field (cell D) and is assumed to approximately cancel the reddish 
tinge, so that the surface appears more purely yellow, similar to cell A. The 
difference in the spectral composition of the central regions that look similar is a 
measure of the strength of the effect. Note that the concrete wavelengths used in 
these examples serve only for illustration purposes; however, the structure of the 
general trend of simultaneous color contrast phenomena is well established in 
empirical studies (Ware & Cowan, 1982; Krauskopf, Zaidi, & Mandler, 1986). 
There are a number of other chromatic color illusions, most of them 
variants of corresponding achromatic color illusions. They include the chromatic 
Cornsweet effect (Arend, 1973; Ware & Cowan, 1983), chromatic Mach bands 
(Ware & Cowan, 1987), chromatic assimilation (von Bezold, 1874; Hurvich, 
1981), the chromatic White's effect (Munker, 1970; Kingdom & Moulden, Dejan Todorović   
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1989), the chromatic neon color illusion (van Tuijl, 1975; Redies & Spillmann, 
1981), the chromatic Koffka-Benussi ring (Koffka, 1935), and others. 
 
 
PART IV: SUMMARY AND CLOSING COMMENTS 
 
1. Summary 
 
In this paper a systematic expository framework for visual constancies and 
illusions is presented and illustrated with many examples. Starting from the 
notions of distal, proximal, and phenomenal visual domains, the relations of 
concordance and discordance between pairs of domains are defined, followed by 
the definitions of four visual modes (concordant, proximal, constancy, illusion) 
as particular constellations of concordance-discordance relations between all 
three domains. Constancies and illusions are characterized by proximal-
phenomenal discordance. 
Attributes of entities of visual domains are divided into the geometric and 
the photometric class, and into the intrinsic and the extrinsic class. Among 
geometric attributes, size and shape (involving extension) are intrinsic, and 
location and orientation (involving position) are extrinsic. Among photometric 
attributes, reflectance is intrinsic and illumination is extrinsic. 
For each kind of visual attribute, two corresponding phenomenal attributes 
are described. The first is distally focused, involving the conscious impression of 
the distal attribute, and the second is proximally oriented, involving the 
conscious impression of the proximal attribute. The need for explicitly distally 
or proximally focused matching instructions is stressed. 
Examples from studies of perception of size, shape, direction, orientation, 
and achromatic and chromatic color perception are discussed, involving all four 
visual modes, with the main stress on constancies and illusions. The presentation 
emphasizes the formal similarities of the structure of these phenomena. 
All constancy examples involve a distal target variable, the corresponding 
proximal variable, and a confound variable that affects the proximal variable in 
addition to the target variable. In cases of size and color perception, two 
confound variables were noted, with corresponding two types of constancies. 
The relations between the variables are presented in analytical form as well as 
through a simple 2x2 scheme, demonstrating the effects of the target variable 
and the confound variable on the proximal variable, and showing how different 
combinations of values of the two independent variables may result in the same 
value of the dependent, proximal variable. Experimental results present the 
following overall picture. Under reduced-cue conditions subjects, in general, 
match objects in terms of values of proximal variables. Under full-cue   Constancies and Illusions in visual Perception 
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conditions, and with distally oriented instructions, the matches are, in general, 
more or less in accord with the values of the distal variable. Such results are 
standard examples of perceptual constancies. However, often results are reported 
in which the values of the attribute of the perceptually matching comparison 
stimuli are larger ('overconstancy') or smaller ('underconstancy') than the 
corresponding values of the standard stimuli. With proximally oriented 
instructions, matching values exhibit a distinct tendency towards proximal 
matching; however, the results are often inaccurate and show more variability 
than with distally oriented instructions. Finally, salient cases are pointed out in 
which relations between phenomenal variables tend to take a form qualitatively 
similar to the relation of the corresponding non-phenomenal variables. 
  Visual illusions also involve perceptual effects of confound variables; 
however, their variation does not affect the proximal variable but the 
phenomenal variable. Most illusion-inducing confound variables are contextual 
variables. Their influence is illustrated through a 2x2 scheme, which also shows 
how different combinations of values of the target and confound variable may 
induce equal values of the phenomenal variables. Experiments which involve 
such combinations, establish the strength of illusions. 
 
 
2. Closing comments 
 
Although the main focus of the paper concerns the structural similarities 
between various constancies and illusions, there are also important differences 
between different kinds of perceptual variables. For example, the relation 
between distal and phenomenal chromatic color is quite different from the 
relation of distal and phenomenal geometric attributes because of the specific 
nature of the transformation of the luminance spectral distribution by the retinal 
rods and cones. Also, the phenomena of perception of location and orientation 
are different from the other attributes in that they explicitly involve reference 
frames, and that the confound variables of gaze direction and eye orientation are 
not external but postural. Furthermore, different kinds of phenomenal attributes 
exhibit different kinds of salient or canonical  values. In chromatic color 
perception, the canonical hues are red, green, yellow and blue, and in achromatic 
color perception the canonical values are black and white. Canonical orientations 
are horizontal and vertical, and the canonical egocentric direction is straight 
ahead. In shape perception, examples of canonical shapes could be the straight 
line, the circle, the square, and other regular geometric bodies. Size perception 
appears to lack canonical values. 
The difference between constancies and illusions was portrayed here as a 
formal difference in the structure of concordance-discordance relations between Dejan Todorović   
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three perceptual domains. However, in the actual research praxis, there are many 
other differences between the studies of constancies and illusions. For example, 
researchers interested in constancies are often guided by a general approach that 
insists on the overall veridicality of perception and the reliability of the 
knowledge of the outside world gained by the senses. In contrast, students of 
illusions appear to be more scientifically motivated by the many curious 
discrepancies between reality and appearance that can be induced even by very 
simple stimulus manipulations. Such differences in basic frameworks have 
created two partly divergent research traditions, the existence of which may 
make the goal of a more unified perceptual theory harder to attain. 
The discussions of various theories of constancies and illusions are 
deliberately left out of scope of the present paper. It must be pointed out that the 
common structure of constancies and illusions as phenomena, developed here, 
does not at all logically implicate a common, single type of explanations of these 
phenomena. Phenomena which are similar according to some criteria, might, and 
sometimes do, have different types explanations, and vice versa. On the other 
hand, the existence of common structure of a set of phenomena does tend to 
suggest similarly structured explanations. For example, in one approach, all 
constancies are explained by a 'taking-into-account mechanism', in which the 
perception of the distal target variable is based upon the corresponding proximal 
variable, with the confound variable being 'taken into account' (Epstein 1973). In 
contrast, in other approaches constancies are based on relative values of 
proximal variables of two or more stimuli (see Rock, 1975), or on higher-order 
optical variables (Gibson, 1979). Some theories of illusions claim that many of 
them can be explained as byproducts of misapplied constancy mechanisms 
(Tausch, 1954; Gregory, 1963; Gillam, 1980). Others stipulate excitatory and 
inhibitory interactions between neural mechanisms. To what extent these general 
approaches are successful in the explanations of the phenomena reviewed here 
can only be decided on the basis of a case by case confrontation of theories with 
concrete data on concrete phenomena. Out of such confrontations, one or more 
dependable unifying perceptual explanatory principles might emerge in the end. 
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